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ABSTRACT 
 
AL-QAEDA AFTER 2001 WITH REGARD TO ITS STRATEGY 
Doğan, Sercan 
 
M.A., Department of International Relations 
Supervisor: Associate Prof. Dr. Mustafa Kibaroğlu 
 
September 2010 
 
After almost a decade since the September 11 Attacks, in which its sanctuary in 
Afghanistan has been shattered and the vigilance against it has been strengthened, al-
Qaeda still survives and poses a threat to both Middle Eastern and international 
security. This research attempts to explain the survival of al-Qaeda after 2001 with 
regard to its strategy. Therefore, the focus of the research is on the effects of al-
Qaeda’s strategy on its survival. Keeping in mind the conventional approach that 
handles al-Qaeda as a religious terrorist group, this research attempts to have a 
broader outlook on al-Qaeda by dealing with it as a non-state armed group. In this 
way, this research handles the situation as an asymmetrical conflict between al-
Qaeda and the U.S. and its allies. Within the asymmetrical conflict, the strategy that 
al-Qaeda has pursued involves an indirect approach that compensated for the 
disadvantages it faced. The results of the research could pave the way for further 
research on the course of al-Qaeda in the context of the changing security 
environment in the Middle East. 
 
Keywords: Al-Qaeda, Asymmetrical Conflict, Guerilla Warfare  
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ÖZET 
 
EL KAİDE’NİN STRATEJİSİNE BİR BAKIŞ 
Doğan, Sercan 
 
Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Doç. Dr. Mustafa Kibaroğlu 
 
Eylül 2010 
 
11 Eylül Saldırılarından hemen hemen on yıl kadar sonra, el-Kaide, Afganistan’daki 
kampları dağıtılmış ve üzerindeki baskı artmış olsa bile halen Ortadoğu’daki 
bölgesel güvenliğe ve genel anlamda uluslararası güvenliğe bir tehdit oluşturmaya 
devam etmektedir. Bu çalışma el-Kaide’nin 2001 sonrası süreçte varlığını devam 
ettirebilmesini, takip ettiği stratejiye eğilerek açıklama girişiminde bulunmaktadır. 
Bu yüzden bu araştırmanın odağında el-Kaide’nin stratejisinin, 2001 sonrasındaki 
bekası üzerindeki etkileri bulunmaktadır. Bu çalışma, el-Kaide’yi bir dini terör 
örgütü olarak ele alan yaklaşımları da göz önünde bulundurarak, el-Kaide’yi daha 
geniş bir perspektiften, bir devlet-dışı silahlı grup olarak değerlendirmektedir. Bu 
sebeple el-Kaide, Ortadoğu’nun 20. Yüzyıl sonunda içinde bulunduğu genel tarihsel 
ve siyasi bağlamı çerçevesinde analiz edilmelidir. Dolayısıyla bu çalışma, mevcut 
durumu, el-Kaide ile ABD ve müttefikleri arasında bir asimetrik çatışma olarak ele 
almaktadır. Asimetrik çatışma bünyesinde el-Kaide’nin stratejisi, karşılaştığı 
dezavantajları telafi eden dolaylı bir tutum benimsemiştir. Çalışmanın sonuçları, 
Ortadoğu’da değişen güvenlik durumu bağlamında el-Kaide’nin alabileceği 
doğrultular üzerine daha ileri araştırmalar için bir temel teşkil edebilecektir. 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: El Kaide, Asimetrik Çatışma, Gerilla Savaşı  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
Several factors can be determinant in a non-state armed group‘s survival. 
Organizational structures, recruitment trends, international and regional system, 
even the characters of the leaders are important in that process. This study‘s aim is 
to explain how the strategy adopted by al-Qaeda affects its survival after 2001. 
Understanding the strategy and making a projection of al-Qaeda‘s future direction in 
both Middle Eastern and international politics are also other aims of this study.  
 
This thesis is significant in several ways. First of all, in the context of the 
asymmetrical conflict between al-Qaeda and the United States of America, after 
almost a decade since the September 11 Attacks, in which its sanctuary in 
Afghanistan has been shattered and the vigilance against it has been strengthened, 
al-Qaeda still survives and poses a threat to both Middle Eastern and international 
security. While these facts are at hand, the conventional wisdom on al-Qaeda after 
2001 handled al-Qaeda within the category of religious terrorism and focused on its 
religious aspect and ideology. Keeping in mind that the focus on the ideological and 
religious aspects might help developing insights on al-Qaeda, it achieves little on 
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explaining its survival. Moreover, the religious terrorism proves to be an 
inappropriate tool for analyzing al-Qaeda. It emphasizes the ―Islamic‖ aspect of al-
Qaeda while underrating its political character. Therefore, it prevents reflecting 
upon its rationality by deeming it an irrational group on an apocalyptic course and 
thereby limiting the analytical approaches to studying al-Qaeda and reinforcing 
current stereotypes and prejudices towards Middle East. This study has significance 
in that it would help making sense of the conditions that ensured al-Qaeda‘s survival 
up to now. 
 
Secondly, considering the changing security environment in the Middle East that is 
marked by the United States withdrawal from Afghanistan and Iraq, the increasing 
risks that the Iran nuclear crisis presents, and the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict, actions and reactions by al-Qaeda can be of increasing significance for 
security and stability in the Middle East. Therefore, studying the strategy of al-
Qaeda would also serve the purpose of developing anticipatory thoughts on al-
Qaeda. 
 
The main question of the study is ―How does the strategy adopted by al-Qaeda 
affect its survival after 2001‖. In the framework of that question, al-Qaeda will be 
contextualized in political and historical senses in order to base the argument that al-
Qaeda has a political rationale that served as an element of its strategy. 
 
Key questions of the thesis include: 
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1. What does the element of asymmetry imply for conflicts between state and non-
state actors? 
2. What are the elements of the strategies that non-state actors adopted in previous 
asymmetrical conflicts in the twentieth century? 
3. How does the conventional literature on al-Qaeda focusing on religious terrorism 
remain insufficient? 
4. How does al-Qaeda fit in the general political and historical context in the Middle 
East at the end of the 20th century?  
5. What are the elements of al-Qaeda‘s strategy that guaranteed its survival? 
 
The outline of the thesis is developed within the framework of the answers to those 
questions in turn. 
 
The study consists of three chapters. In the first chapter, the conceptional framework 
for the study will be laid out. The non-state actors and their participation in conflicts 
will be handled. The asymmetry and the transnationality elements of contemporary 
conflicts will be discussed. The elements of strategies that non-state actors in the 
previous asymmetrical conflicts in the history adopted will be questioned. 
Consequently, it is determined that ―in asymmetrical conflicts, strategies of non-
state groups that involved an indirect approach aimed at compensating for the 
asymmetrical conditions had a strong potential for success‖.  
 
In the second chapter, the shortcomings of the conventional understanding of al-
Qaeda will be questioned. The study, which bases its assumptions on al-Qaeda that 
it possesses a political rationale, then, moves on to inspect the main elements in al-
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Qaeda‘s evolution through the 1990s. The political context of al-Qaeda, which rests 
on the observation that non-state groups in the Middle East gained significant 
importance in the 1990s, will be deliberated with respect to structural aspects.  
 
In the third and last chapter the strategy of al-Qaeda that helped it offset the 
asymmetry it faces, will be explained. Firstly, the political rationale, which is a key 
element in al-Qaeda‘s strategy, will be detailed based on the historical and political 
contexts that it fit in. Then the communication element of al-Qaeda‘s strategy will 
be examined with regard to al-Qaeda leaders‘ statements. Lastly, the way that al-
Qaeda conducted the war will be inspected and deliberated as the guerilla warfare 
approach in a regional and global scale. The study will be ended with the 
conclusion. 
 
The basic hypotheses of the study can be listed as: 
 
- Al-Qaeda‘s strategy is the primary factor that contributed to its survival in 
the post-2001 era, through compensating for the asymmetrical condition it 
faces. 
- The communication and the conduct of warfare are elements of Al-Qaeda‘s 
strategy in the post-September 11 period that compensated for the 
asymmetrical condition al-Qaeda faced.  
- Al-Qaeda‘s political rationale covers a significant place in its strategy under 
the post-2001 era conditions. 
- Current approaches towards al-Qaeda in religious terrorism studies underrate 
its political rationale. 
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- Contextualizing al-Qaeda in political and historical senses is a prerequisite 
for understanding al-Qaeda‘s political rationale 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
THE CONCEPTIONAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 
 
2.1. Non-State Actors in International Relations 
 
Nation-states have constituted the focus of the International Relations discipline for 
a long time. Their interactions among themselves and their environments and forms 
of relations among them, whether it is friendly or hostile, provided a mainstream 
research subject for the International Relations and its branches. It is a commonly 
established understanding that the prominence of nation-states in politics have 
begun with the Westphalia Peace Treaties in 1648 (Baylis and Smith, 2001: 43; 
Jackson and Sorensen, 1999: 17). For the reason that the nation-state was based on a 
phenomenon that emerged in Europe in the 17
th
 century, theoretical approaches in 
the International Relations discipline took nation-state as sovereign political entity 
within a clearly defined borders for granted (Jackson and Sorensen, 1999: 14-17). 
The traditional approaches in the International Relations theory came to recognize 
the nation-state as the basic unit of analysis. As Jackson and Sorensen stated ―Even 
theorists who seek to get beyond the state usually take it as a starting-point: the state 
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system is the main point of reference both for traditional and for new approaches‖ 
(Jackson and Sorensen, 1999: 21).  
 
With the decolonization of colonial empires in the first half of the 20
th
 century, it is 
assumed that the spread of the nation-state model, which was being adopted by the 
newly-independent political entities, represented ―the globalization of international 
society‖ of nation-states (Jackson, 2001: 45). This was indeed an almost global 
expansion of a model that was European in origin. Therefore, the adoption of the 
European model gave birth to a series of problems that proved to be a major cause 
for conflict in international relations. While those problems transcend the scope of 
this research in a great extent, it is possible to note that the Cold War generated a 
controlled atmosphere in which, problems and conflicts were granted meaning 
within a general clash in global scale.  
 
There have been various deliberations on how the end of the Cold War affected the 
international relations. The approach within this conceptional framework is that the 
end of the Cold War culminated in an era that marked by globalization, thus 
presented problems in the main point of reference for theoretical approaches in the 
International Relations discipline that is the nation-state. While the term 
globalization could be associated with a great deal of aspects, it is possible to reach 
a satisfactory definition that is relevant for the International Relations, which depicts 
globalization as referring to ―processes whereby many social relations become 
relatively delinked from territorial geography, so that human lives are increasingly 
played out in the world as a single place‖ (Scholte, 2001: 14-15). The relevance of 
globalization for the International Relations discipline is related to the effects of 
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those processes on the nation-state as the basic unit of analysis. The nation-state has 
three basic elements that are the sovereignty, territoriality and monopoly of 
legitimate violence. The sovereignty meant the absence of any authority over the 
nation-state, and territoriality implied the existence of borders that demarcated the 
extent of individual nation-states‘ reach. The nation-state enjoyed the monopoly of 
legitimate violence and war was regarded as an instrument in resolving conflicts 
among nation states (Jackson and Sorensen, 1999: 15; Jackson, 2001: 42).  
 
The globalization affected the sovereignty aspect of nation-states, which have come 
to enjoy the concentration of power in their hands since the Peace of Westphalia 
(Mathews, 1997: 50). The globalizing economy through international economic 
organizations and multinational corporations have played a limiting role on nation-
states‘ control of its domestic economy. Nation-states enjoyed the power of being a 
reference of identity for their citizens; however, increasing transnational links and 
rising local tendencies made possible by the globalization, caused people to seek 
identity references in both transnational and sub-national spheres (Mathews, 1997: 
51-52). Finally, nation-states have been gradually losing their monopoly on the 
legitimate use of force, given the onset of unconventional conflicts in the post-Cold 
War world. 
 
The focus of this research‘s conceptional framework is on the emergence of non-
state actors that are involved in the use of force. While the non-state actors include a 
range of entities from corporations to NGOs, the unit of analysis in this study is the 
transnational non-state armed groups, which are frequently observed parties of the 
post-Cold War conflicts. Non-state actors is a significant phenomenon at the end of 
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the 20
th
 century, and their emergence owes to the inability of nation-states to 
―impose the prepotency of state institutions at the state level‖ (Bruderlein et al, 
2007: 2). The restrictions imposed upon nation-states in the globalization process 
contributes to this inability and thereby creating a situation where, as Hammes 
states, ―In contrast to the ever increasing international and transnational aspects of 
economic and social activity, security is becoming much more local‖ (Hammes, 
2007: 3). With the erosion of state monopoly on violence, non-state actors begin to 
fill the void by taking security issues in their own hands. This situation can go as far 
as to the ―state failure‖, which constitutes a void in terms of security that led 
America to state that ―America is now threatened less by conquering states than we 
are by failing ones‖ in the National Security Strategy of 2002. Ulrich Schneckener 
states ―armed non-state actors are 1) willing and able to use violence for pursuing 
their objectives; and 2) not integrated into formalized state institutions‖ and 
proposes those categories for armed non-state groups: rebels or guerrilla fighters, 
militias or paramilitaries, clan chiefs or big men, warlords, terrorists, criminals, 
mercenaries and private security companies, and marauders (Schneckener, 2006: 25-
27). For Vinci, non-state armed groups are ―organizations that have the capacity for 
systematic military action‖ (Vinci, 2008: 299). 
 
While the non-state actors are not a very recent phenomenon, their increasing 
participation in conflicts since the 1990s makes them a significant consideration for 
security studies (Kibaroğlu, 2002). The Cold War had ruled out the possibility of a 
total war between the factions, due to the nuclear deterrence. After the Cold War, 
the prospects of interstate war had little to promise as Iraq‘s invasion of Kuwait had 
shown. Rather, the world witnessed increasing trend towards conflicts that non-state 
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armed groups have taken place. Afghanistan, Israel-Palestine, Bosnia, Lebanon, 
Chechnya, Somali and large parts of Africa were clear examples of this trend. The 
September 11 events brought the issue of transnational armed groups to the forefront 
of the United States security agenda. The War on Terror that was declared after the 
9/11 Attacks represented a challenge initiated by state actors against non-state 
armed groups, most importantly al-Qaeda, which forms the specific subject of 
analysis of this research. 
 
 
2.2. The Asymmetry and Transnationality 
 
The participation of non-state armed groups in armed conflicts raises the issue of 
asymmetry. The asymmetry in armed conflict, at the first glance, implies ―wide 
disparity between the parties, primarily in military and economic power, potential 
and resources‖ (Stepanova 2008: 14-15). In this sense, many armed conflicts in 
history had elements of asymmetry, such as the superiority that the Nazi Germany 
had enjoyed in the initial process of the Second World War. The most striking 
moment of the display of asymmetry during the Second World War was perhaps the 
in which Britain tried to resist the German aggression between July 1940 and June 
1941, when it had to deal with Germany alone.  
 
This study employs the concept of the asymmetrical conflict in assessing the armed 
conflict between al-Qaeda and the United States of America, in a very general sense. 
Although armed conflicts always imply an element of asymmetry, the asymmetrical 
conflict between America and al-Qaeda include more than asymmetry in military 
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sense. Therefore, this study adopts the perspective of the asymmetrical conflict laid 
by Stepanova, that is  
an asymmetrical conflict is treated as conflict in which extreme imbalance of 
military, economic and technological power is supplemented and aggravated 
by status inequality; specifically, the inequality between a non- or sub-state 
actor and a state. (Stepanova, 2008: 19) 
 
As stated, the asymmetrical conflict involves asymmetry beyond quantifiable 
elements such as military and economic capabilities. The status asymmetry in an 
armed conflict is reflected in the nature of adversaries. It determines the frame in 
which the parties shape their approach to the armed conflict. In an armed conflict 
that bears the asymmetry in both power and status imply a significant difference in 
the ways that the adversaries conduct their efforts. The state actor, at the first place, 
is required to hold accountability towards its own audience. Whether it is a 
democratic or an authoritarian state, the state has to ensure support from its domestic 
constituency (the voters or the power elites) on the need to carry on the 
confrontation (Mack, 1975). Besides, there are international factors that can shape 
the state‘s conduct of conflict in the case that it includes a transboundary dimension. 
First is the principal of sovereignty, which stands as a basic principle in relations 
among states despite the fact that it is prone to be eroded in the globalization 
process. Second is the reactions towards the state party to the conflict that might 
arise due to its tactical and operational preferences. An example for this is the 
reactions against America‘s use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, i.e. drones, against 
militants in the Pakistani territory, which both goes against Pakistan‘s sovereignty 
and causes civilian casualties. On the other hand, the non-state party carries on the 
conflict with little regard for norms or regulations about the conduct of conflict, i.e. 
jus in bello. Rather, it would be unnatural to assume that the non-state party would 
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consider itself bound by those regulations. Besides, the non-state party is not 
constrained by a constituency factor as much as the state party, although it dwells on 
a support base through its constituency. The lack of constraints and the disparity in 
military power might as well lead the non-state party to adopt tactical moves that the 
state party seeks to avoid, such as attacks that could result in high civilian casualties.  
 
The asymmetry in both material and status sense characterizes the armed conflicts of 
the post-Cold War era. It is even more significant, considering the first decade of the 
21
st
 century. The insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan are the basis that the above 
statement rests upon. Al-Qaeda‘s challenge to America represents a similar case to 
those conflicts in the 20
th
 century, that non-state armed groups challenged states in 
Vietnam, Afghanistan, Chechnya, Nepal, and various parts of Africa. An 
exceptional element in the latest incarnations of asymmetrical conflict is the 
increasingly significant transnational dimension. 
 
The transnational aspect of asymmetrical conflicts in the onset of the 21
st
 century 
covers several issues. Firstly, the geographical extent that the conflict is being 
conducted involves territories of multiple nation-states. The conflicts that America 
is involved in the Middle East cannot be confined to Iraq and Afghanistan alone. 
Through the facilities in communications and transportation provided by the 
globalization process, the non-state parties make use of the geographical extent in a 
beneficial way. Besides, the U.S. is involved in the Middle East through the 
CENTCOM, its theatre of operations, which possess the capability to exert military 
power in a transboundary scale.  
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Secondly, the non-state parties to the conflicts have a transnational character. In the 
Report by the Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research (HPCR) in 
2007, transnational non-state armed groups are defined as ―groups that use force, 
flow across state boundaries, utilize global communication and transportation 
networks, seek global influence and to communicate with a wider audience, and 
increasingly undertake military operations against dominant states‖ (HPCR, 2007: 
18). As far as the Middle East is concerned, since the Soviet Invasion of 
Afghanistan, foreign volunteers to the conflicts have become a distinctive pattern.  
 
As the Middle East example suggests, the transnationality of the non-state groups 
involve an ideological aspect as well. Transnational non-state groups define their 
political agendas, with no regard to the administrative boundaries. In various parts 
of the world, where the state boundaries have an artificial character, the emergence 
of ideologies that pay no heed to the boundaries disseminate both the activities and 
propaganda of non-state armed groups in an extensive geographical setting that 
boosts the ranks of non-state parties with recruits from a wide constituency.  
 
 
2.3. The Element of Strategy in Asymmetrical Conflicts 
 
Consistent with the main hypothesis of this study that proposes al-Qaeda‘s strategy 
as the primary factor that ensured its survival after 2001, the strategies that non-state 
armed groups in asymmetrical conflicts constitute a final section in this conceptional 
framework. 
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Carl von Clausewitz, in his seminal work, defined strategy as ―the employment of 
the battle to gain the end of the war‖ (Clausewitz, 1873). Within his approach that 
places warfare in the framework of politics, Clausewitz seems to focus on the resort 
to actual battles. English military historian, B. H. Liddell Hart, defines strategy as 
―the art of distribution and application of military capabilities, in order to reach 
political objectives‖ (Hart, 2002: 249). Hart emphasized the utilization of military 
capabilities, of which battles in Clausewitz‘s understanding constitute an important 
but not the only aspect in wars. Another definition that is offered by Arreguin-Toft 
―refers to an actor‘s plan for using armed forces to achieve military or political 
objectives.‖ (Arreguin-Toft, 2001: 99).  
 
As far as the asymmetrical conflict between a state and a non-state actor is 
concerned, the definition of strategy in this study builds on the mentioned 
approaches and refers to an actor‘s plan for utilizing its assets in order to reach its 
objectives. In this definition, the assets of parties include both the military and non-
military instruments that they have in disposal. This is especially valid if non-
military aspects such as propaganda, psychological operations, and communications 
are taken into consideration. It might be argued that actors may develop a distinct 
strategy for each of those elements; however, for the sake of conceptional 
refinement, the strategy concept that covers those elements in an integrative way is 
preferred in this study. 
 
The considerable success that non-state armed groups as weak parties have achieved 
in asymmetrical conflicts in the period following the Second World War stands as a 
deviation from the pre-Second World War period, in which superior military power 
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in asymmetrical conditions ensured victory, such as the British victory against the 
Sudanese, and the Italian victory in Ethiopia (Mack, 1975: 176). In the course of the 
20
th
 century, the Chinese resistance against Japan and the Vietnam resistance against 
France and America stand as early examples. Several points of importance can be 
derived from those instances that represent a set of principles of a strategy for non-
state groups that have a potential for success.  
 
Firstly, as Mack argues, a decisive military outcome did not determine the ultimate 
result of the conflict (Mack, 1975: 178). The forces of the non-state groups did not 
destroy their adversaries in the military dimension. Rather, they denied their 
adversary a chance of decisive confrontation. Mao Tse Tung‘s study of the guerrilla 
warfare confirms this: ―There is in guerrilla warfare no such thing as a decisive 
battle‖. Secondly, those conflicts took place in a long period of time. The Chinese 
conflict took place from 1937 to 1945, and the Vietnam conflict lasted twenty years 
from 1955 to 1975. The length of the confrontation confronts the state actor with 
increased costs of maintaining presence and operations over time, which are 
political as well as economic (Mack, 1975: 184). Thirdly, as the conflict progressed, 
the state parties increased the scale of their military presence, which magnified the 
maintenance costs for the state party, and support for the non-state party. For 
example Mack mentions the French ordeal in Vietnam: ―The initial military 
repression directed against the rebels achieved for the militants what they had been 
unable to achieve for themselves-namely, the political mobilization of the masses 
against the French‖ (Mack, 1975: 180-181). This means that, increased military 
commitments by the state party could backfire, given the extent that the non-state 
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party is able to exploit its political repercussions through successful use of 
propaganda. 
 
The lack of decisive military clashes, the length of conflict and the support that the 
non-state parties can garner through propaganda form the principles of strategy that 
involves the usage of non-state party‘s assets in order to strike at ―the political will‖ 
of the state party that is characterized by ―war weariness‖ (Mack, 1975: 181). In this 
context, the strategy of the non-state party shows an indirect character in the way 
that Liddell Hart has outlined in his book (Hart, 2002). Therefore, the indirect 
approach by the weak party offsets the advantages of the strong party that it gains 
from having superiority in military, economic, and technological aspects. As 
repeated against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan as well, the strategy that adopts an 
indirect approach carries a strong potential for the success of non-state party.  
 
 
2.4. Assessment: Al-Qaeda’s Struggle 
 
Al-Qaeda is a non-state armed group that has emerged in the Middle East under a 
specific political and historical context. It possesses a transnational character in its 
several aspects. Those aspects are al-Qaeda‘s organizational structure and 
recruitment potentials, the geographical extent and the ideological aspect. Al-
Qaeda‘s organizational structure is not confined to a single place. Its core leadership 
is claimed to be in the border region of Afghanistan and Pakistan, and its branches 
reach out beyond national boundaries. As it was the case during the Afghan Jihad, 
al-Qaeda has the potential to appeal to a multitude of nationalities. Therefore, its 
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cadre and rank-and-file consists of individuals from different countries. Besides, al-
Qaeda‘s concern and theatre of operations transcends the scope of a single country. 
Al-Qaeda seeks to act on behalf of the Muslims, not a single ethnicity. It carries on 
its struggle in a wide geographical extend. Al-Qaeda‘s aims, therefore, related to its 
geographical constituency and ideology, involves all lands that Muslims live, 
regardless of administrative boundaries. Therefore, al-Qaeda is a transnational 
armed group engaged in a struggle against Middle Eastern states and America. 
 
As mentioned above, the conflict between al-Qaeda and America has an 
asymmetrical nature. The asymmetry involves more than the relative situation of the 
parties in terms of physical power. The disparity between the adversaries‘ status 
implies another aspect of the asymmetry. The fact that a non-state group is pitted in 
a conflict against a state, demonstrates the asymmetry in status. Due to the disparity 
in status, the conduct of the conflict between al-Qaeda and the U.S. differs from 
conflicts between states. Al-Qaeda‘s course in the context of its struggle suits the 
asymmetrical nature of the conflict. As will be elaborated in the following chapters, 
al-Qaeda formulated the outlines of its strategy, according to the asymmetrical 
nature of the struggle. It sought to adopt an indirect approach in its actions. By 
initiating spectacular attacks, al-Qaeda intended to target the United States‘ will to 
carry on the struggle. It may be discussed further what al-Qaeda actually gained 
from the September 11 Attacks; however, it is clear that the symbolic nature of the 
targets showed an intention to emphasize the psychological damage that the attacks 
would inflict. Al-Qaeda, through its indirect approach, avoided a direct clash with 
the U.S. forces, except a brief period after the fall of Taliban at the end of 2001. 
Those points illustrate that the asymmetrical nature laid down the conditions that 
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would shape any strategy to be pursued, and the al-Qaeda leadership were well 
aware of those conditions and sought to formulate a strategy that would compensate 
for the disadvantages, and boost the advantages of the asymmetry. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
AL-QAEDA IN HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL CONTEXT 
 
 
 
As stated in the introduction chapter, the conventional wisdom and mainstream 
perspectives towards al-Qaeda focus on its religious ideology and worldview. 
However, this chapter seeks to verify the following hypotheses put forward in the 
introduction: 
- Current approaches towards al-Qaeda in religious terrorism studies 
underrates its political and strategic nature 
- Contextualizing al-Qaeda in political and historical senses is a 
prerequisite for understanding al-Qaeda‘s political rationale 
 
 
3.1. The Conventional Wisdom on Al-Qaeda 
 
The period after the 9/11 attacks were marked by a sharp increase in terrorism 
studies. While Cronin states that ―a principal interest in terrorism virtually 
guarantees exclusion from consideration for most academic positions‖, numerous 
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works on terrorism have emerged in the political and intellectual climate in the 
aftermath of the September 11 (Cronin, 2002/03: 57). It is possible to consider this 
as a normal process since the attacks on the World Trade Center, as a terrorist attack 
on the US homeland on an unbelievably large scale, came to be regarded as an 
unprecedented event that caused a great emotional impact besides its actual and 
concrete effects. In this context, questions such as ―Why did this happen?‖, ―Who 
are the perpetrators?‖, ―Why do they hate us?‖ remained prevalent and sought for 
answers.  
 
The address by George W. Bush to the Joint Session of the Congress on 20th 
September 2001 laid down the basics of the official approach to al-Qaeda. In the 
speech George W. Bush describes al-Qaeda as terrorist practicing ―a fringe form of 
Islamic extremism‖. According to Bush, the cause of the attacks is ―the terrorists‘ 
directive‖ that ―commands them to kill Christians and Jews, to kill all Americans, 
and make no distinctions among military and civilians, including women and 
children‖. Bush also stresses that the al-Qaeda terrorists hate the American freedoms 
and ―kill not merely to end lives, but to disrupt and end a way of life‖. Another 
patterns in Bush‘s address is the distinction between Muslims and al-Qaeda:  
Its teachings are good and peaceful, and those who commit evil in the name of 
Allah blaspheme the name of Allah. The terrorists are traitors to their own 
faith, trying, in effect, to hijack Islam itself. 
 
Bush also states the analogy that places al-Qaeda besides the totalitarian movements 
of the 20th century. In this context, al-Qaeda terrorists  
are the heirs of all the murderous ideologies of the 20th century. By sacrificing 
human life to serve their radical visions -- by abandoning every value except 
the will to power -- they follow in the path of fascism, Nazism, and 
totalitarianism. 
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Various official documents repeat similar basic patterns on al-Qaeda. In the preface 
of the document, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001 by the US Department of State, 
Colin L. Powell, the former Secretary of State of the US stated that, ―When the 
terrorists struck on September 11, their target was not just the United States, but also 
the values that the American people share with men and women all over the world 
who believe in the sanctity of human life and cherish freedom‖. The National 
Strategy for Combating Terrorism that was released on February 2003 begins with 
the expression that:  
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, in Washington, D.C., New York 
City, and Pennsylvania were acts of war against the United States of America 
and its allies, and against the very idea of civilized society. 
 
Based on the official approach, the official response crystallized as engaging in a 
―Global War on Terrorism‖ (GWoT), which first and foremost implied a military 
course of action against al-Qaeda. While the US waged GWoT in the overseas, it 
also adopted new legal regulations, i.e. the US Patriot Act, which invoked the 
security-freedom debate. 
 
The academia‘s response to the questions ―Who are the perpetrators?‖, ―Why do 
they hate us?‖ and ―Why did this happen?‖ poses three general categories that the 
review on the literature rests upon.  
 
 
3.1.1. Religious Terrorism 
 
Religious terrorism discourse, which was already developed in the wake of terrorist 
incidents in the 1990s, presented itself as an analytical tool to handle the puzzling 
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phenomenon of al-Qaeda. Religious terrorism rests upon the categorization of David 
C. Rapoport. David C. Rapoport, in his article conceptualized four waves of modern 
terrorism (Rapoport, 2004). The names Rapoport gave to each of the wave describe 
the ―energy driving each‖. According to his analysis the first three waves are the 
anarchist wave in the 19th century, the nationalist wave after the First World War, 
and the New Left wave in the 1960s and 1970s. At the end of the twentieth century, 
the fourth wave has begun to unfold, which he names as the ―religious wave‖ 
(Rapoport 2004:: 61). However, Rapoport contends that the religious element in the 
fourth wave had a distinctive Islamic character because of the rise of Islamic 
militancy after 1979 (Rapoport, 2004: 62-63). Major events at the end of the 
twentieth century such as the Iranian Revolution in 1979, the Afghan Jihad against 
the Soviet Union in the 1980s and the end of the Cold War, have provided the 
groundwork for establishing the rhetoric of ―religious terrorism‖. As early as 1984, 
in the article, ―Fear and Trembling: Terrorism in Three Religious Traditions‖ 
(Rapoport, 1984: 658-677), Rapoport begins to delve deeper into the study of 
religious terror groups. He defines his subject of study as ―terror‖ designated in the 
works of terrorologists as ―holy or sacred‖ (Rapoport, 1984: 659). In this article, 
Rapoport analyzes the Thugs in India, the Assassins in the Medieval Islamic 
civilization and the Sicarii in the Ancient Jerusalem as antecedents of modern 
terrorism phenomenon.  He stated that ―Before the nineteenth century, religion 
provided the only acceptable justifications for terror‖ (Rapoport, 1984: 659). From 
the nineteenth century onwards modern terrorist groups had religious dimensions as 
well; however Rapoport contends that ―sacred terror, on the other hand, never 
disappeared altogether, and there are signs that it is reviving in new and unusual 
forms‖. (Rapoport, 1984: 659). Considering the period that Rapoport conducted his 
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studies for this piece (1981), it is reasonable that the Islamic resurgence that was 
witnessed after the Iran Islamic Revolution influenced his approach. Rapoport, after 
reminding that one of the key characteristics of terrorist violence is that the victim is 
not the actual target, rather the impact of the violence on society is sought after, 
states that for holy terror, ―the primary audience is the deity‖ (Rapoport 1984: 660). 
In accordance with that he mentions the Hindu Thugs, who did not want any public 
witness to their acts of violence. In this sense, the act of violence for the deity could 
be interpreted as a ritual of sacrifice; therefore it is devoid of any political meaning. 
Furthermore, the purpose of holy terror, then, comes to be identified as a 
transcendental one (Rapoport 1984: 659). Another pattern Rapoport reveals in the 
article is found in his evaluation of Assassins. Assassins who were active in the 
Middle East between 11st-13rd centuries were Muslims. Rapoport points that 
―message-oriented religions such as Islam are inclined to assume a unilinear view of 
history that may be fulfilled when all humans hear and accept the message.‖ 
(Rapoport, 1984: 665). Therefore, Rapoport claims Islam is one such religion and is 
likely to produce millenarian movements, which seek a major transformation in the 
world that will alter everything. In this respect, holy terror employs violence in 
order to bring about or hasten this transformation. This apocalyptic vision is shared 
by both Assassins and Zealots. After the historical analysis, Rapoport states that the 
terrorism literature misconceives the difference between holy terror and modern 
terror. In his view, the distinction between holy terror and modern terror involves 
nature and kind rather than scale (Rapoport 1984: 672). The patterns that he derives 
from the history constitute the nature of holy terror, which, as Rapoport concludes 
(Rapoport, 1984: 674), is reviving ―especially in, but not exclusive to, the Middle 
East.‖ 
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Mark Juergensmeyer recounts the terrorist incidents of Irish Catholic nationalists, 
Sikh and Kashmiri separatists, Sri Lankan Tamil Tigers, al-Qaeda, and Jewish and 
Muslim extremists and puts forward two characteristics that they share: ―First, they 
have been violent –even vicious- in a manner calculated to be terrifying. And, 
second, they have been motivated by religion‖ (Juergensmeyer, 2003: 4). 
Juergensmeyer, then, contends that ―religion has supplied not only the ideology, but 
also the motivation and the organizational structure for the perpetrators‖ 
(Juergensmeyer, 2003: 5). The pattern of religion as a justification mechanism that 
was also put forward by Rapoport, is echoed in Juergensmeyer‘s work as well. 
Juergensmeyer mentions that ―the proportion of religious groups in the late 1990s 
increased from sixteen of forty-nine terrorist groups to twenty-sx of the forty-six 
groups‖ (Juergensmeyer, 2003: 6). His definition for religious terrorism is ―public 
acts of violence at the turn of the century for which religion has provided the 
motivation, the justification, the organization, and the world view‖ (Juergensmeyer, 
2003: 7)  
 
For Magnus Ranstorp ―a surge of religious fanaticism has manifested itself in 
spectacular acts of terrorism across the globe‖ (Ranstorp, 1996: 43). He refers to 
important incidents in the 1990s such as Baruch Goldstein‘s attack against a mosque 
in Hebron, the murder of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, the Tokyo subway 
attack, the World Trade Center attack in Manhattan, and the Oklahoma City 
bombing incident. He claims that ―all (those attacks) are united in the belief on the 
part of the perpetrators that their actions were divinely sanctioned, even mandated, 
by God‖ (Ranstorp, 1996: 43-44).  According to Ranstorp, ―religious extremists are 
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unified in their justification for employing sacred violence, whether in efforts to 
defend, extend or avenge their own communities, or for millenarian or messianic 
reasons‖ (Ranstorp, 1996: 44). The causes for the rise of religious terrorism, for 
Ranstorp (1996: 46) are ―the explosion of ethnic-religious conflicts and the rapidly 
approaching millenium‖. Another pattern in Ranstorp‘s analysis of religious 
terrorism is their perspective of the struggle. He puts forward that ―in many ways, 
religious terrorists embrace a total ideological vision of an all-out struggle to resist 
secularization from within, as well as from without. They pursue this vision in 
totally uncompromisable holy terms in literal battles between good and evil‖ 
(Ranstorp, 1996: 51). According to Ranstorp, ―this perception, in turn, is often used 
to justify the level and intensity of the violence‖ (Ranstorp, 1996: 52).  Another 
pattern that is found in Ranstorp‘s analysis is the indiscriminate and lethal character 
of the violence it employs: ―While the religious extremists uniformly strike at the 
symbols of tyranny, they are relatively unconstrained in the lethality and the 
indiscriminate nature of violence used‖ (Ranstorp, 1996: 54). Ranstorp concludes 
that ―religions have gradually served to define the causes and the enemies as well as 
the means, methods and the timing of the violence itself‖ (Ranstorp, 1996: 62). 
Therefore, for Ranstorp, religious terrorism involves not only justification and 
motivation processes but also organizational structure and modus operandi as well.  
 
Bruce Hoffman‘s works on terrorism contributes to the rhetoric of ―religious 
terrorism‖. Hoffman wrote a paper in 1993, titled ‗―Holy Terror‖: The Implications 
of Terrorism Motivated by a Religious Imperative‘, which was published by the 
RAND Corporation. Hoffman‘s arguments in this paper served as a foundation for 
many works after the 9/11 attacks. In this paper, Hoffman, too, links the 
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contemporary religious extremists to the Thugs, the Assassins and the Sicarii 
(Hoffman, 1993: 1). Hoffman distinguishes ―the holy terror‖ from ―the secular 
terror‖ on the grounds that they have ―radically different value systems, mechanisms 
of legitimization and justification, concepts of morality, and Manichean worldview 
that the ‗holy terrorist‘ embraces‖ (Hoffman, 1993: 2). According to Hoffman, 
―terrorism assumes a transcendental dimension, and its perpetrators are thereby 
unconstrained by the political, moral, or practical constrains that seem to affect other 
terrorists‖ (Hoffman, 1993:2). For Hoffman religious terrorists are engaged in a 
―total war‖. Therefore, religious terrorists regard violence ―as an end in itself‖ 
(Hoffman, 1993:3). Hoffman‘s analysis puts forward that religious terrorists seek to 
bring about religious and ritualistic ―purification‖ for their respective communities 
and total destruction of the existing order, which proves their millenarian and 
apocalyptic worldview (Hoffman, 1993: 4-10). For Hoffman, the apocalyptic and 
millenarian views of religious terrorists effect their preference for indiscriminate 
attacks that would cause mass casualties, thereby increasing the risk of terrorists 
attaining the weapons of mass destruction (Hoffman, 1993: 11).    
 
The September 11 Attacks have undoubtedly influenced the way terrorism is being 
considered. Bruce Hoffman (2003: 439) puts that  
―The fundamental nature and character of terrorism changed with 9/11 and 
moreover has continued to evolve since then. It is becoming increasingly 
difficult to categorize or pigeonhole as an identifiable phenomena, amenable 
to categorization or clear distinction.‖ 
He also argues (Hoffman 2003: 439) it would be too optimistic to claim that the end 
of al-Qaeda is near, because the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq have greatly 
increased its sense of commitment and purpose. Hoffman is also adamant on the 
―nimble, flexible, and adaptive‖ nature of al-Qaeda, which made it easier for it to 
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ensure its survival after the destruction of its camps in Afghanistan (Hoffman, 2004: 
551). According to Hoffman al-Qaeda adapted to the conditions in the aftermath of 
the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan and undertook a transformation (Hoffman, 2004: 
552). For its global terrorism campaign, the facilities in Afghanistan were no longer 
needed. Instead, the dissolution of its central command and hierarchy made it 
assume a transnational, non-hierarchic character. Hoffman concludes that 
transnational terrorism phenomenon that al-Qaeda represents has evolved into ―a 
more diffuse and amorphous character‖ which makes ―the traditional way of 
understanding terrorism and looking at terrorists based on definitions and attributes 
given to al-Qaeda‘s evolution and development‖ no longer relevant (Hoffman, 2004: 
556). 
 
Morgan considers al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden as ―the prime examples of the 
new terrorism‖ but he adds that ―Islamic radicalism is not the only form of 
apocalyptic, catastrophic terrorism‖ (Morgan, 2004: 29). Morgan‘s assessments 
reflect the main arguments of the new terrorism that ―terrorists‘ methods and 
perspectives‖ reflect this apocalyptic character, which states ―terror and violence as 
an end in itself‖ (Morgan 2004: 30).  Furthermore, Morgan mentions the lack of 
constraint on behalf of the new terrorists, which makes mass-casualty attacks 
possible. The lack of constraint, as Morgan puts, is brought about by the religious 
imperatives for terrorism that make ―terrorists look at their acts of death and 
destruction as sacramental or transcendental on a spiritual or eschatological view‖ 
(Morgan 2004: 32). 
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Steven Simon and Daniel Benjamin labeled the post-Cold War world as a ―new age 
of terrorism‖ that begun in 1993 with the attempt to bomb the World Trade Center 
Buildings (Simon and Benjamin, 2001: 5). The authors mention the incidents, the 
attempt blow 11 airliners in Pacific in 1995, the east Africa embassy bombings, the 
terrorist attack attempt in the US and Jordan in the time of the millennium and the 
latest September 11 events and points out to the trend of preference for mass-
killings in the ―new terrorism.‖ According to the authors (Simon and Benjamin 
2001: 5-6), al-Qaeda as a ―religiously-motivated‖ terrorist group would not avoid 
indiscriminate violence, unlike other terrorist groups of the past, because it does not 
have to enter a negotiation process that could be impeded by mass-killings, in which 
to discuss a ―set of political demands.‖  Because of the fact that al-Qaeda does not 
have a ―plausible political agenda‖ it does not have any constraints on violence 
(Simon and Benjamin 2001: 6). Besides, Simon and Benjamin state that it is highly 
probable for al-Qaeda, which is a group that has maximal objectives and an 
eschatological worldview, and seeks the humiliation and annihilation of its 
enemies,‖ to acquire weapons of mass destruction. 
 
Jonathan Stevenson too, regards al-Qaeda as a part of the ―new terrorism 
phenomenon‖ (Stevenson, 2001: 35). He claims al-Qaeda has an ―apocalyptic 
vision‖ and ―religious hatred‖ drives them to initiate deadly mass attacks. Those 
characteristics form a qualitative difference between al-Qaeda and old terrorist 
groups.  
 
Audrey Curth Cronin states that in the post-9/11 world ―a new phase of terrorist 
activity, the jihad era‖ has been taking place (Cronin, 2002: 38). In this era, as 
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Cronin mentions, ―religious terrorism‖ has gained prominence and became more 
dangerous than other types of terrorism. For Cronin five characteristics make 
religious terrorism a dire international security problem (Cronin, 2002: 41-42). The 
first characteristic is the ―Manichean worldview‖ of religious terrorists, which 
stresses the struggle of good against evil. The second is that the religious terrorists 
are less constrained in their use of violence. The third is that religious terrorists are 
―unconstrained by secular values or laws,‖ because it is the system that they seek to 
overthrow. The fourth is that the religious terrorists are trying to replace the currents 
system through apocalyptic violence, due to their ―alienation from the existing 
social system‖. Lastly, the popular support that al-Qaeda enjoys is so ―dispersed in 
the civil society‖ that, it is nearly impossible to contain that support in order to keep 
it from reaching al-Qaeda. Cronin puts that al-Qaeda maintains all those 
characteristics and is a new type of terrorist organization(Cronin, 2002: 45).  
 
Carter suggests that the September 11 events have made ―the post-Cold War 
security bubble finally burst‖ (Carter, 2001: 5).  What he means by bubble is the 
policies and strategies of US decision-makers on security matters of lesser 
importance, which he names as peace-making and humanitarian issues. However, 
Carter stipulates that ―catastrophic terrorism‖ that was witnessed in September 11 
events made its way to the agenda of the Bush Administration as an ―A-list threat‖ 
(Carter, 2001: 6). As it can be easily observed in other scholarly articles as well, 
Carter lists the ―catastrophic terrorism‖ instances as the September 11 events, the 
Oklahoma City incident in 1995, and Tokyo subway Sarin gas attack (Carter, 2001: 
6-7). All those instances show how far the threat posed by terrorism to the 
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civilization can go, given ―the availability of war-scale destructive power‖ through 
the advances in technology (Carter 2001: 6).  
 
According to Rohan Gunaratna, al-Qaeda ―has evolved into a movement of two 
dozen groups‖, in consistence with its ―founding charter‖ by Abdullah Azzam, 
which states al-Qaeda as the ―pioneering vanguard of the Islamic movements‖ 
(Gunaratna, 2004: 92-93). He claims that the September 11 events served as an 
inspiration and instigation for ―local and regional Islamist groups worldwide‖ 
(Gunaratna 2004: 93). By pointing out to the fact that, terrorist attacks after 
September 11, 2001 were carried out by al-Qaeda‘s associate groups, Gunaratna) 
elaborates that the associate groups of al-Qaeda have received inspiration and 
incitement and form a serious threat (Gunaratna, 2004:93. It is also stressed in 
Gunaratna‘s article that the threat posed by al-Qaeda has increased due to the U.S. 
invasion of Iraq (Gunaratna, 2004: 97). That is because, firstly invasion and the 
following developments in Iraq has created a deep resentment among Muslims, from 
which al-Qaeda propagandists can benefit and secondly, Iraq has provided al-Qaeda 
militants a place in which they can gain valuable experience. Gunaratna underlines 
the significance of terrorism threat by signifying that it moved ―beyond the al-Qaeda 
into the galaxy of violent Islamist groups‖ even to ―motivated and resourceful 
individuals‖ such as Abu Musab al-Zarkawi (Gunaratna, 2004: 98). Therefore, 
Gunaratna concludes that terrorist threat posed by al-Qaeda will not end even if 
Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri is killed; because the inspiration and 
incitement that al-Qaeda has transmitted to other Islamist groups and new 
generations constitutes the main source of terrorist threat (Gunaratna, 2004: 99).  
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3.1.2. Deficiencies of Religious Terrorism 
 
The literature on al-Qaeda suggests that, al-Qaeda as a terrorist organization is 
possible to analyze within the religious terrorism category. Accordingly, the 
religious terrorism is a distinctively ―new‖ type of terrorism. Unlike previous 
terrorist groups, which utilize violence for their political objectives, religious 
terrorist groups employ ―sacred‖ violence, in order to ―bring about religious or 
ritualistic ‗purification‘ for their respective communities and total destruction of the 
existing order, which proves their millenarian and apocalyptic worldview‖ 
(Hoffman, 1993: 4-10). They are ―less constrained in their use of violence‖ (Cronin, 
2002. 45) than their secular counterparts, because ―they do not have to enter a 
negotiation process that could be impeded by mass-killings‖ (Simon and Benjamin, 
2001: 6). Therefore, they conduct their attacks in an indiscriminate manner, driven 
by ―an apocalyptic vision and religious hatred‖ (Stevenson, 2001: 35).  
 
While religious terrorism scholars admit that every religion has extremist groups 
that resort to violence, political and militant organizations as well as terrorist groups 
in the Middle East constitute the focus of religious terrorism studies. That is mainly 
because terrorist groups in the Middle East, especially al-Qaeda, uses religious 
language and symbols in an overt manner. Therefore, religious terrorism implies a 
connection between Islam and violence. In this sense, many terms and concepts are 
employed in an interchangeable manner, such as ―Islamic terrorism, Islamist 
terrorism, Islamist fundamentalism, Islamism, Political Islam, Muslim fanatics‖. 
Those terms fortify the assumption that al-Qaeda and similar groups are engaged in 
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a religious or holy war against their enemies. However, the utilization of those 
concepts as analytical tools brings about problems. Firstly, the Islam religion has 
over one billion adherents, which belong to more than one cultural, political and 
social heritage. Therefore, it is almost impossible to reach a generalized assumption 
about Islam, such as violence and terrorism is inherent in Islam. Secondly, those 
terms are misleading because they regard the religious rhetoric of the groups as a 
primary and defining characteristic. In this sense, religious terrorism studies 
undervalues, even ignores the political nature of terrorist groups utilizing religious 
rhetoric. Thirdly, by deeming religious terrorist groups have apocalyptic, non-
political, therefore nonnegotiable objectives, religious terrorism studies leaves room 
for no response other than military engagement, suppression and elimination. And 
lastly, despite attempts at distinguishing the ―True Islam‖ from the ―corrupt‖ Islam 
that al-Qaeda claims to represent, the usage of such terms might alienate the public 
opinion in the Middle East and reinforce current prejudices and stereotypes against 
the people and countries in the region.   
 
David C. Rapoport‘s categorization of the periods in the modern history of terrorism 
is built on the general ideological pattern that he identified in each ―wave‖. For 
example, his categorization includes the Red Army Fraction and the Red Brigades, 
which have leftist orientation in terms of the political spectrum, in the third wave of 
―New Left terrorism‖. Similarly, certain groups within the national liberation 
movements of the early twentieth century belong to the ―Nationalist Second Wave‖ 
of terrorism. Within this categorization, al-Qaeda takes place in the ―Religious‖ 
fourth wave of terrorism along with groups and movements such as the Sikh 
separatists in India, the Jewish terrorists in Israel that assassinated Israeli Prime 
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Minister Rabin in 1995, Aum Shinrikyo in Japan that released nerve gas in the 
Tokyo subway, and the Christian Identity movement alleged to be associated with 
the Oklahoma City bombing of 1995 (Rapoport, 2006:62). While such a 
categorization of the modern history of terrorism could prove useful in terms of 
historiography, it leaves many questions about international security unanswered. It 
is unclear as to how an ideological categorization of terrorist groups shed a light on 
potential tactics, operations and strategy of certain terrorist groups within a ―wave‖? 
Furthermore, the religious terrorism category goes beyond the purpose of the mere 
sake of historiography. Handling al-Qaeda within the analysis offered by the 
religious terrorism obscures its political nature. Such obscuration is achieved in two 
dimensions. Firstly, al-Qaeda‘s political rationale is neglected through the allegation 
of irrationality. And secondly, the radical religious dimension of al-Qaeda is 
overemphasized while depriving it of its political and sociocultural context.   
  
By deeming that the aims of the religious terrorists are not utilitarian (Hoffman, 
1993: 3; Jenkins, 2002: 5-7), unlike the aims of the secular terrorists, the analysis 
claims that the violence that was invoked do not necessarily refer to any political 
objective that seeks to amend a certain grievance. Therefore, the religious terrorists 
allegedly do not have any political objectives that they seek to achieve by coercing 
the political authority with violent attacks. That is because they allegedly seek ―the 
attainment of the religious and racial ‗purification‘ of their respective countries‖ 
(Hoffman, 1993: 6). As for al-Qaeda, ―[H]is objective is not merely to murder as 
many of us as possible and to conquer our land. Like the Nazis or Communists 
before him, he is dedicated to the destruction of everything good for which America 
stands‖ (Podhoretz, 2004: 18). Furthermore, Richard Pipes, an emeritus professor on 
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history at Harvard University, claims that ―The attacks on New York and the 
Pentagon were unprovoked and had no specific objective. Rather, they were part of 
a general assault of Islamic extremists bent on destroying non-Islamic civilizations. 
As such, America's war with Al Qaeda is non-negotiable‖ (Pipes, 2004). Reinforced 
by the general understanding that laid out by the religious terrorism analyses and 
officially sanctioned by Bush‘s statement that ―These terrorists kill not merely to 
end lives, but to disrupt and end a way of life‖, al-Qaeda is regarded as a band of 
―madmen bent on wreaking havoc‖ (Mohamedou, 2007: 66). Mohamedou sums up 
the general fallacies of this approach as follows: 
(1) We do not know what Al Qaeda is, (2) Al Qaeda is made up of impoverished 
ragtags, alienated drifters merely channeling their free floating anger animated 
by homicidal animosity, and (3) Al Qaeda wants to destroy the Western world 
and its way of life. The logical conclusion of these three arguments is that (4) Al 
Qaeda‘s demands are unacceptable, since they are apocalyptic, nihilistic and 
irrational. (Mohamedou, 2007: 65) 
 
Related to the first fallacy above, there indeed has been a lack of information about 
who the terrorists were or what al-Qaeda is. However, the other fallacies, which are 
reinforced by academic studies as well as popular journalistic best-sellers and 
official statements, further obscured al-Qaeda. In this way, al-Qaeda was 
successfully detached from the regional political and sociocultural context it arose 
from. Al-Qaeda‘s usage of religious rhetoric was not new in any sense, since the 
usage of religious rhetoric has been common in the Middle Eastern groups 
particularly after 1979. Popular figures in the Middle East, such as Hasan al-Banna 
and Sayyid Qutb in Egypt, and Mawdudi in Pakistan have been both 
conceptualizing and practicing what was later named as the Political Islam since the 
first half of the Twentieth century (Kepel, 2001: 30-38). The world witnessed more 
association of religious rhetoric with politics in the 1980s with the revolution in 
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Iran, the Mujahedeen resistance in Afghanistan, the Hizballah in Lebanon and 
HAMAS in Palestine. Terrorism experts already had started to think about 
―terrorism motivated by a religious imperative‖ (Hoffman, 1993; Ranstorp, 1996; 
Rapoport, 1984). Then, the sheer quality of the 9/11 Attacks was associated with al-
Qaeda‘s religious rhetoric, since only a religious imperative could lead to such an 
act. John O. Voll stated that ―the idea that the actions could have been undertaken 
by religious militants was clearly credible to almost everyone‖ (Voll, 2001: 1). 
Another commentator claimed that ―the horrendous events of September 11 
precipitated a head-on clash of two competing worldviews and societal orders: 
Muslim Theism versus secularized Western Humanism‖ (Taylor, 2002: 293). The 
magnitude and the suicidal nature of the attacks led to observers and analysts to 
emphasis the non-secular characteristics of the perpetrators. ―The 2001 disaster took 
place at a time when experts had been defining a new form of terrorism focused on 
millennial visions of apocalypse and mass casualties‖ (Morgan, 2004: 29). ―From 
early in the last decade, an increase in the proportion of terrorists groups with 
religious motivation seemed to correlate with increased lethality of attacks.‖ (Simon 
and Benjamin, 2001: 6). ―Today‘s terrorists increasingly look at their acts of death 
and destruction as sacramental or transcendental on a spiritual or eschatological 
level. The pragmatic reservations of secular terrorists do not hold back religious 
terrorists‖ (Morgan, 2004: 32).  
 
While assessing terrorist attacks such as the 9/11, focusing on the elements of 
motivation and justification has produced thought-provoking insights into the 
mindsets of individual terrorists, such as Mark Juergensmeyer‘s monograph titled 
―Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence‖, which was 
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written in 2000 and updated in 2003. Juergensmeyer dismisses any strategic or 
political goal beneath the acts of religious terrorism; but rather he contends that such 
attacks posses dramatical, theatrical and symbolic characteristics (Juergensmeyer, 
2003: 124-126). Symbolic attacks, therefore, ―mimic religious rites‖ 
(Juergensmeyer, 2003: 128) and can be considered as intended towards violence per 
se. This approach moves terrorism studies closer to individual and social psychology 
by emphasizing the individual conditions of motivation and justification. Within this 
framework, al-Qaeda loses its relevance for security studies, because due to its 
religious character, the implications of its attacks for international security and the 
immediate objectives sought by the perpetrator are no longer the concern. What is 
left is a cult-styled group of individuals, who are motivated enough by religion to 
undertake acts of even suicide terrorism and think of themselves engaged in a 
―cosmic war‖ (Juergensmeyer, 2003: 148-167). At this point, the political and social 
context of the organization, the range and causes of its appeal, and the degree that 
their stated grievances relate to reality do not matter. So do the discussions related to 
policies for countering it. 
 
 
3.2. The Historical Context 
 
3.2.1. Al-Qaeda’s Formation 
 
Al-Qaeda
1
 originated in the Afghan Jihad against the Soviet invasion, in the 1980s. 
Its leader Osama bin Laden is a member of wealthy bin Laden family, which was 
                                                 
1
 The word ―al-qaeda‖ means literally ―the base.‖ 
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close to the Saudi royalty. The mujahedeen‘s resistance against the Soviet Union 
was covertly backed by the U.S. through the cooperation of American, Saudi and 
Pakistani intelligence organizations. Osama bin Laden was closely and personally 
involved with the Afghan Jihad through the Services Office (Maktab al Khidamat) 
that established an international recruitment network for the Afghan Jihad in 
Peshawar. He also participated in actual battles that took place against Soviet troops, 
which earned him honor among the mujahedeen. During this period, Osama bin 
Laden met with Abdullah Azzam, a radical Islamist intellectual from Palestinian 
descent, who was influential on him on issues of ideology, Islam and jihad. When 
the Soviet invasion had ended, Osama bin Laden had significant personal and 
organizational contacts with mujahedeen from all around the world, who came to 
fight against the Soviet Union. Bin Laden utilized these connections in order to form 
a core of Arabs that fought in Afghanistan, as al-Qaeda (Gunaratna 2003: 26-27).   
 
With the death of Abdullah Azzam who advocated building and fortifying an 
Islamic state in Afghanistan, Osama bin Laden and his core followers‘ approach 
favoring conducting jihad throughout the Islamic world against apostate Arab 
regimes, remained as the sole option. Osama, through his devotion, leadership 
capabilities and immense wealth, acquired many followers among the Arab 
mujahedeen from all around the Arab world. In Gunaratna‘s words, these 
mujahedeen were the core of an ―organization that would channel the energies of the 
mujahidin into fighting on behalf of oppressed Muslims worldwide, an Islamic 
‗rapid reaction force‘ (Gunaratna, 2003: 29). 
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Ayman al-Zawahiri, who was the leader of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, was a 
prominent member of the Egyptian faction among the Arab mujahedeen. Zawahiri, 
as an ideologue and advocate for international jihad, became the second chief of al-
Qaeda. He is claimed to have a great influence on Laden to the extent that his 
―former lawyer Muntasir al-Zayyad have argued that Osama was transformed from 
a guerrilla into a terrorist by al-Zawahiri‖ (Gunaratna 2003: 34). And his rise in the 
ranks of al-Qaeda shows the prominence of transnational jihad approach. 
 
The end of the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan culminated in two course of action for 
mujahedeen groups that carried on the fight. First, various local resistance groups 
initiated a fight both among themselves and against the Soviet-installed Najibullah 
government for domestic political power. Second, Osama bin Laden‘s al-Qaeda, 
through the fighters from all around the Middle East that it organized during the 
Jihad, started to prepare for a campaign against what he saw as a threat to the 
Islamic World. The Soviet withdrawal gave a sense of confidence to bin Laden and 
his group, because they believed that they have defeated one of the two superpowers 
in the world (Gunaratna 2003: 29). Consequently, the Afghan Jihad presented 
Osama bin Laden and his core cadre a loosely-connected transnational contacts that 
will enable their transnational struggle, a self-confidence that boosted their 
determination for struggle and a war-torn country –Afghanistan- that they would 
utilize as a territorial infrastructure later on.  
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3.2.2. Al-Qaeda’s Preparatory Period in the 1990s 
 
Osama bin Laden and the Saudi Royal family had been enjoying close contacts after 
the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. The event that triggered the string of 
events which caused Osama distance himself from Saudi Arabia was Iraq‘s invasion 
of Kuwait on August 2, 1990. Following Iraq‘s invasion, Osama offered the Saudi 
King Fahd his assistance against the Iraqi threat, consisting of 5.000 veteran 
mujahedeen. Much to his dismay his offer was rejected and US troops were 
deployed in Saudi Arabia against Iraq (Gunaratna 2003: 37). The US presence in 
Saudi Arabia meant non-Muslim presence in the land of the two holy mosques for 
Osama bin Laden and the radical Islamist ideology in general. Osama began to 
express displeasure with the Saudi royal family‘s policies and corruption. He was 
expelled from the country in 1991 and his citizenship was canceled in 1994.  
 
Bin Laden settled in Afghanistan under the Taliban regime, after having to relocate 
from Sudan, where he had been under patronage of Dr. Hasan al Turabi. In 
Afghanistan, al-Qaeda and Taliban formed a relationship mutually beneficial to 
both. Al-Qaeda has established camps in Afghanistan and attached its veteran 
fighters to Taliban forces in their struggle against the Northern Alliance (Gunaratna 
2003: 54). Al-Qaeda formed links with other Islamist groups and parties throughout 
its voyage from Sudan to Afghanistan. According to Gunaratna al-Qaeda, ―after 
establishing links with about twenty Islamist groups engaged in guerrilla warfare 
and terrorism, he supported them with funds, training and weapons‖ (Gunaratna, 
2003: 41). Besides, veteran mujahedeen from the Afghan Jihad who had ideological 
affiliation to al-Qaeda‘s cause served as liaison wherever they were, in the Arab 
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world. Osama‘s charismatic leadership capabilities, devotion, and honor gained 
through jihad against the Soviet invasion, helped him forge such contacts which 
would prove useful in initiating a large scale terrorism campaign against their 
enemies. Also, when Osama was in Kandahar in 2000, he married a Yemeni 
woman; therefore built contacts with Yemeni tribes (Gunaratna 2003: 65). The 
formal declaration of war was in 1998, when Osama succeeded in creating alliances 
with several radical groups. The World Islamic Front for the Jihad against the Jews 
and the Crusaders were declared on 23 February 1998. Its signatories were Abu 
Yasir Rifa‘i Ahmed Taha of Egyptian Islamic Group, Sheykh Mir Hamza of Jamiat-
ul Ulema-e-Pakistan, and Fazlur Rahman of the Jihad Movement in Bangladesh 
along with Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri. The statement announcing the 
formation of the alliance called for killing the Americans and their allies, and put 
jihad as an ―individual duty‖ for all Muslims.  
 
Al-Qaeda‘s intentions were clearly put forward in this statement. On August 7, 1998 
the two U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania were bombed on the eighth 
anniversary of the U.S. deployment to the Arabian Peninsula. The next target was a 
US destroyer, USS Cole, in Aden, which was hit by a boat filled with explosives on 
October 12, 2000. The attacks on September 11 were against the most visible 
symbols of the American hegemony. The World Trade Center and the Pentagon 
stood for the economic and military aspects of American dominance. Al-Qaeda 
gained enormous notoriety through the symbolic impact of the attacks, not the actual 
impact. Building on these symbolic gains, al-Qaeda was able to strengthen its 
alliances with groups from all around the Islamic world and become a source of 
inspiration for like-minded groups. The symbolic weight of the 9/11 Attacks, also, 
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ensured an interest towards al-Qaeda in both official and academic circles, albeit its 
struggle against the U.S.A. started years ago.  
 
 
3.2.3. Al-Qaeda After 2001 
 
The 9/11 Attacks caused an escalation in America‘s engagement with al-Qaeda. 
Before 2001, al-Qaeda had taken place among the US security concerns however, 
with the onset of Global War on Terrorism, the American efforts against al-Qaeda 
intensified. The American invasion of Afghanistan deprived al-Qaeda of its 
territorial infrastructure. Under the Taliban rule, Al-Qaeda had enjoyed the 
opportunity to create and maintain its headquarters and camps within Afghanistan. It 
also had a guerrilla unit named 055 Brigade, formed of fighters from all around the 
Middle East. The 055 Brigade was attached to the Taliban forces and helped it in its 
struggle against other factions in Afghanistan (Gunaratna, 2003: 78-80). Besides, 
America also engaged al-Qaeda in the financial field (Aydınlı, 2006: 301-302). On 
September 24, 2001, the Office of Foreign Assets Control froze almost $100 million 
associated with organizations and individuals linked to al-Qaeda (Gunaratna, 2003: 
88). Al-Qaeda has also lost some of its experienced cadres. Most important of those 
are Mohamed Atef (responsible for military operations of al-Qaeda, killed in a 
missile attack in November 2001), Abu Zubaydah (March 2002), Abu Faraj al-Libbi 
(Alleged no. 3 of al-Qaeda,captured in Pakistan in May 2005), Saif al-Islam al 
Masry (Al-Qaeda Shura member, apprehended in Pankisi Gorge in Georgia in 
October 2002), Abd al Rahim al Nashiri (Allegedly responsible for the attack on 
USS Cole in 2000), Khalid Sheikh Muhammad (the mastermind of the September 
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11 Attacks), and Ramzi bin al-Shibh (organizer of the Hamburg Cell that carried out 
the September 11 Attacks).  
 
Those developments were made possible by joint efforts of many states in 
countering terrorism. It meant that al-Qaeda, then, had to effort in a very limited 
environment. Faced against the American military engagement, al-Qaeda had to 
withdraw in order to avoid annihilation. Its retreated in the battles of Tora Bora in 
December 2001 and Shahi Kot in March 2002 and hid in the porous mountain 
border region between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Al-Qaeda leaders chose to adopt a 
strategic retreat, because they would not afford being worn down. The asymmetric 
nature of the stand-off between al-Qaeda and the America forces at the end of 2001 
dictated that it is vital for al-Qaeda to avoid being beaten, in order to survive and 
carry on its war. It is well-known that the weaker party in an unconventional conflict 
has to evade defeat in order to win in the long term. Even though al-Qaeda suffered 
losses and setbacks, the choice of strategic retreat would enable it to ensure that the 
war on terror would continue for a long time, therefore it would force the United 
States in a war of attrition. Al-Qaeda basically withdrew to fight another day, a 
choice that illustrates al-Qaeda leaders‘ strategic behavior. 
 
The damage that al-Qaeda‘s core has suffered caused a shift in the organizational 
aspects of the group. Even though al-Qaeda has been acting as an umbrella above 
many diffuse groups in the Middle East, the developments after 2001 stressed that 
degree of diffusion between al-Qaeda‘s center and its affiliates and associated 
groups in various parts of the world. The al-Qaeda center started to have less direct 
control on the peripheral groups associated with it. Rather, through publishing video 
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and audio messages, the Al-Qaeda leadership provided general outlines and left 
tactical details to the local groups‘ initiative. This implied that al-Qaeda had ―self-
contained, mission-oriented strategic units in South Asia, Western Europe, East 
Africa, North Africa, Jordan and Iraq, the Gulf and, possibly, North America‖ 
(Mohamedou, 2007: 54). In this respect, al-Qaeda preferred deterritorialization as 
detachment from a definite territorial location and disappearance, rather than 
institutional presence (Mishal and Rosenthal, 2005: 280). Mishal and Rosenthal 
depicts the new organizational aspect of al-Qaeda as ―a dune organization‖ (Mishal 
and Rosenthal, 2005: 275-291). The authors argue that ―terrorist organizations 
acting in the manner described with respect to Al Qaeda, act in a dynamics of a fast-
moving entity that associates and dissociates itself with local elements while 
creating a global effect‖ (Mishal and Rosenthal, 2005: 282).  
 
After 2001, al-Qaeda initiated terrorist attacks in over ten different countries. The 
most significant of those are the Bali bombing in 2002, the attacks in Istanbul and 
Riyadh in 2003, the Madrid train attack and the attack against Khobar Towers in 
Saudi Arabia in 2004, and the London subway attacks of 2005. Besides those 
incidents, al-Qaeda was heavily involved in the situation in Iraq. The local al-Qaeda 
associate, from 2006 on, had a major part in the instability in Iraq, due to its 
spectacular attacks. Its origin was the Jamaat Tawhid wal Jihad founded by Abu 
Musab al Zarqawi from Jordan. Al Zarqawi attached its organization to al-Qaeda 
and renamed it as Tanzim Qaidat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn (al-Qaida of the Jihad 
Organization in the Land of Two Rivers). It targeted the US forces, the Iraqi central 
authority and the Shiites, and contributed to the instability and sectarian strife in Iraq 
between 2006 and 2008.  
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Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is another affiliate of al-Qaeda, which 
showed increasing activity in the post-2001 era. The Saudi Arabian and Yemenite 
branches of al-Qaeda merged under the name of AQAP. Before the merger, the local 
al-Qaeda affiliates have initiated spectacular attacks in both Saudi Arabia and 
Yemen. Their merger led to an increasing risk of instability in Yemen. In 2009, it 
attacked the American consulate and fought against the Yemen military. Yemen also 
stands as a liaison point for Africa and the Middle East. Therefore, it poses a 
strategic importance for al-Qaeda for its geographical situation that provides 
connection between al-Qaeda‘s Afghanistan-Pakistan front, the Middle East and 
Gulf affiliates, and African allies. 
 
Al-Qaeda activity has risen in Afghanistan and Pakistan as well. The exodus of 
Taliban and al-Qaeda militants from authority in Afghanistan to the border region of 
Pakistan has contributed to the survival of both groups in 2002. It also provided 
local radical groups in Pakistan their experiences and support. Besides, ―These 
groups provided al-Qaeda and other groups with the logistics support to regroup in 
Pakistan, developing in the process a new coalition of terrorists‖ (John, 2005). It is 
possible to observe the creation of a local Taliban group in Pakistan, Tehrik-i 
Taliban Pakistan in this period. From 2006 to 2010 both terrorist attacks and 
insurgent activity in Pakistan have risen to high numbers. According to Anne 
Stenersen from the Norwegian Defense Research Establishment, al-Qaeda, after it 
had regrouped in Pakistan, was involved in the insurgency in Afghanistan and 
terrorist attacks in Pakistani cities (Stenersen, 2009: 4). Pakistan‘s redundant attitude 
during the al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders‘ flight to the border region during the 
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American invasion of Afghanistan provided shelter for militants. Then, as America 
focused on the invasion of Iraq, the situation in Afghanistan grew dire, as the 
remaining international forces and the ineffective Afghan government proved weak 
against defeating the Taliban insurgency. Al-Qaeda and Taliban both enjoyed the 
lack of authority in Pakistan‘s tribal border region and Afghanistan. When the US 
attention turned to the Taliban insurgency in 2009, the Taliban had expanded its 
power throughout Afghanistan and al-Qaeda benefited from its links with the 
Taliban and various groups in both countries (Riedel, 2007). 
 
 
3.3. The Political Context 
 
While religious terrorism analysts strip al-Qaeda from its political nature and limit 
the scope of analysis to the violence per se, the elements of motivation and 
justification, and therefore the psychological and individual aspects, they obscure 
the relevance of al-Qaeda‘s strategic and political analysis. In order to shed a light 
on al-Qaeda‘s relevance for a strategic analysis, it must be put in a political and 
social context. The aim of this section is not to delve deeper into sociology of 
Middle East and religion. Rather, the political atmosphere beneath al-Qaeda‘s 
existence must be highlighted. Through this approach, it is possible to make sense of 
al-Qaeda‘s war against the U.S.A.  
 
While seeking to place al-Qaeda in a political context, the study of actions and 
reactions by political actors both regional and extra-regional in the context of the 
Cold War is related to the concept of Middle East system as a subsystem (Gause III, 
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1999), in which the political actors include nonstate/substate groups such as the 
Muslim Brotherhood, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and Palestinian groups; as well as 
states. Considering the state actors, it should be emphasized that extra-regional 
powers such as Britain (until 1971, from then as a U.S. ally) France (at the 
beginning of the Middle East system), Soviet Union (until 1991) and the United 
States are concerned  as well. 
 
Throughout the last three decades of the 20th century, non-state groups in the 
Middle East gained significance due to three factors. With an in-depth approach, it 
is possible to notice that the Arab-Israel conflict had a great effect in the rise of non-
state groups in the Middle East. The failure of conventional warfare against Israel 
and the loss of strategic depth because of Egypt‘s reconciliation with Israel led the 
Arab states adopt an unconventional approach in the Arab-Israel conflict. This 
approach involved sponsoring creating, sponsoring and manipulating non-state 
groups in Palestine and war-torn Lebanon. The Arab states‘ failure in the Palestinian 
question caused non-state groups act themselves on behalf of the perceived 
insecurities of the Arab people. Thus, the Arab-Israel conflict contributed to the 
legitimacy crises of the Arab states, while also causing them to adopt a different 
policy within the conflict. Another factor that marks the onset of non-state groups in 
the Middle East was the Saudi-Iranian conflict after 1979. The geostrategic bid for 
dominance of both states also involved the struggle for hegemony in the ideological 
context. Iran had a revolutionary rhetoric that called for revolution against un-
Islamic rulers in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia relied on its oil wealth to spread its 
Wahhabi ideology. Both states The Saudi Arabia-Iran competition for prominence 
marked the 1980s and had significant influence on radical movements, since both 
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states fought over the primacy of their Islamic doctrine and supported Islamist 
groups in this context. Lastly, the Arab states lacked a depth and cohesion within 
their societies as well, which deteriorated the legitimacy crises. As the population 
rised in high proportions and intensified in urban areas, states failed to respond the 
needs of the people in an adequate way. Increasingly Middle Eastern states 
strengthened their security apparatus, rather than seeking to win popular support 
through concrete measures and reforms.  
 
The October War of 1973 left a profound effect on the Middle East system. One of 
its consequences was the Egypt‘s changing position within the regional system. 
Anwar Sadat, who came to power after Jamal Abdul Nasser‘s death in 1970, 
initiated significant policy changes in many areas. After reinforcing his position 
against left-wing Nasserists and Marxists, he launched a concerted attack against the 
Israeli forces by crossing the Suez Canal that Israel had invaded in 1967, with Syria 
and Iraq. The Arab states gained initial success in the Sinai Peninsula and Golan 
Heights; however then they were faced with a heavy counter-assault by Israel. The 
Israeli forces were only 101 kilometers away from Cairo, when the U.S. put pressure 
on Israel in order to reach an armistice with Egypt. The U.S. pressure on Israel was 
partially influenced by the decision by the Arab members of OPEC  to put forward 
an oil embargo against the United States and the Netherlands until Israel retreated 
from all occupied lands (Kepel 2000: 79). The October War had shown that oil was 
a formidable weapon in the Arab states. In the Middle East Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq 
and the Gulf emirates had a significant boon in their wealth due to the rising oil 
prices in this process. Saudi Arabia was the country that benefited most from this 
situation. During the 1970s, it had utilized the oil wealth to spread its Wahhabi 
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doctrine of Islam through funding organizations such as the Muslim World League 
(Rabita al-Alam al-Islami), which was founded in 1962, in order to initiate charities, 
social aids, mosque constructions and distribution of books and written materials of 
the Wahhabi doctrine throughout the Muslim World. Thus, the Islamic creed in its 
most strict Wahhabi fashion started to take the place of Arab nationalism, which has 
undergone failure and dissolution (Kepel 2000: 79-87). Growing Saudi influence 
was translated into Saudi Arabia‘s bid for prominence in the region, especially after 
Egypt‘s isolation in 1979. 
 
The year 1979 represents a turning point in the regional system and it is the year in 
which developments with profound impacts on the Middle East has taken place. The 
Iranian monarchy was overthrown by a revolution and an Islamic republic took its 
place. The Revolutionary Iran detached from the alliance with the U.S. and adopted 
a more proactive diplomatic stance. It sought to export its revolution and clashed 
with Saudi Arabia for prominence. Both states relied on their influence on the 
Islamist groups and movements. Iran supported militant groups throughout the 
Muslim world seeking to incite revolutions against un-Islamic governments. Iran‘s 
revolutionary message had quite a prestige among the Muslim peoples throughout 
the countries; however its appeal was restricted by two important phenomena. One 
is that the majority of Iran belonged to the Shia sect of Islam. The other is the Iran-
Iraq War, which was launched by Iraq in 1980 and last eight years. In this 
confrontation Iraq was largely supported by Sunni Arab states, which grew wary of 
Iran‘s revolutionary rhetoric and discourse addresing Muslims. This support took 
forms of economic, political and military aid. Due to war against Iraq, the Iran 
revolution was identified with Shi‘ism and Iran nationalism (Roy, 2005: 220-238). 
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Therefore, export of revolution was limited to radical militant Shi‘a groups such as 
the Hezbollah in Lebanon.  
 
In 1980s, the geopolitical outlook of the Middle East represented a fertile ground for 
the growth of Islamist movements; especially radical militants. No longer having 
Egypt as a partner in the Palestinian conflict, the Arab states refrained from the idea 
of conventional military confrontation with Israel. That is because Egypt provided a 
second front in the Sinai Peninsula that forced Israel to divide its military forces and 
attention to another front. In the Arab-Israeli conflict, radical Arab states such as 
Syria and Iraq sought to employ non-conventional methods against Israel. After the 
revolution, Iran followed suit. The civil war-torn Lebanon since 1975 has been a 
breeding ground and haven for terrorist and militant groups, which received Iranian, 
Syrian and Iraqi support. Strategies of Syria, Iraq and Iran created a suitable 
environment for development of militant groups in Middle East. Besides that the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 sparked a resistance in the 
country, which would be expressed as the Afghan Jihad in Islamic terms. The 
ongoing Jihad in Afghanistan received recruits i.e. mujahedeen, from all over the 
Islamic world. Saudi Arabia and Pakistani intelligence agencies cooperated with the 
CIA in order to facilitate the flow of recruits, arms, and supplies to the Afghan 
Jihad. Intended as a proxy war against the Soviet Union in the context of the Cold 
War, the Afghan Jihad proved to be training grounds for radical militants –
mujahedeen- from the Muslim countries. Besides,  
 
The Saudi monarchy‘s legitimacy, which rested on the Wahhabi religious doctrine, 
the regime‘s custodianship of Islam‘s holiest shrines and the generosity provided by 
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the oil wealth suffered a tremendous blow when non-Muslim soldiers were 
dispatched upon the King‘s request in order to protect the country against Iraq. The 
Wahhabi ideological hegemony over the Arab World as well as the Saudi regime‘s 
legitimacy was being shattered in this context, since Saddam Hussein has been 
employing religious rhetoric for legitimizing its actions (Kepel 2000: 245). Non-
Muslim, mostly Christian soldiers in the Arabian Peninsula during the Gulf War of 
1990-1991 indicated the concrete presence of the West in the Middle East. The 
implications of this presence were significant. It radicalized the regional polarization 
in the interstate relations in the sense that the West‘s agenda for the Middle East, 
which consists of the security of Israel and the secure flow of oil to the world 
market, became more intertwined with particular agendas of regional states, 
therefore causing more visible Western interference that ignited much resentment 
around the region. Militant and non-militant Islamists alike, labeled the West‘s 
penetration in the Middle East as the return of the ‗Crusaders.‘ The American 
military presence in Iraq held an important place in Osama bin Laden‘s statements 
as well. ―The Arabian Peninsula has never -- since Allah made it flat, created its 
desert, and encircled it with seas -- been stormed by any forces like the crusader 
armies spreading in it like locusts, eating its riches and wiping out its plantations.‖ 
 
A major flaw of the modern state structures in the Middle East, especially those of 
Arab countries is that the control of the state mechanism is confined to members of 
a small, privileged group within the society. Saddam Hussein‘s regime relied on 
kinship allegiances centered on the town of Tikrit where Hussein was from. 
Similarly, the minority Alawite community in Syria is still in power. Syria and Iraq 
are the most acute examples in this regard, however apart from these two regimes; 
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the monarchical dynasties rule many countries in the Middle East, which show the 
same general tendency. These characteristics of regimes limit the political sphere to 
a distinguished group within the society; therefore curb the potentials for an 
encompassing identity beyond traditional identity references and exacerbate the 
crisis of legitimacy in the Middle Eastern countries. On the contrary, these states 
still exist today after five troubled decades and Olivier Roy emphasizes the 
incorporation of these states into the world order under the guarantee of the United 
Nations and International Law (Roy, 2005: 34-35). He also stipulates that even 
though the regimes might change in one way or another, the mechanism of the state 
remains because of ―the presence of ‗the state phenomenon‘ being more resistant to 
developments than it was thought before‖ (Roy, 2005: 35). 
 
Valentine M. Moghadam refers to general demographic trends and statistics of 
urbanization and population growth in the Middle East after 1950 (Moghadam, 
2008: 281-307). In these decades, the urban populations increase due to 
attractiveness of cities in terms of social and economic potentials they present, and 
difficulties of the rural life neglected by governments‘ policies favoring the cities 
(Moghadam, 2008: 282). However, as Kepel points out, the massive migration to the 
urban areas caused problems in housing, services, waste disposal, sanitation, and 
regulation of construction for urban planning and thus slums, makeshift residences, 
shantytowns constitute the outlying suburbs in Middle Eastern cities (Kepel, 2000: 
71). Moreover, Moghadam expresses that ―the economies of the cities cannot absorb 
their large urban populations, leading to unemployment, underemployment, and 
poverty among urban populations‖ (Moghadam, 2008: 284). Governments‘ policies 
oriented towards modernization of their countries included development of 
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education systems as well. In the region, except Saudi Arabia, the education systems 
are designed according to the Western style, which were improved in the period 
between 1950 and 1980 (Roy, 2005: 74). These developments culminated in 
increasing literacy rates and high school graduates. Young and educated segments of 
urban populations grew expectations about future careers and employment; however 
overall economic development trends of their countries were unable to meet those 
expectations. This situation proved to be a significant factor of the radicalization of 
urban youth in Middle Eastern societies (Roy, 2005: 75).  
 
The Middle Eastern states‘ foreign policy decisions had an impact on their 
perspectives in the society as well. Most significant of those are Egypt‘s peace with 
Israel and Saudi Arabia‘s call for the American military support after Iraq‘s invasion 
of Kuwait. The former example led to the Egyptian President Anwar Sadat‘s 
depiction as the ―Pharaoh‖ by radical militants and his assassination in 1981 
(Mandaville, 2007: 84). Osama bin Laden‘s al-Qaeda detached its Saudi links after 
that incident and declared the Saudi regime as apostate. (Mandaville, 2007: 256). 
The states‘ weakness against perceived Western aggression and incursion (Israel and 
the USA) was coupled with their power against political dissidents in the domestic 
sphere. When the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan had ended, battle-hardened Arab 
militants returned their home countries and sought to replicate their success at the 
home front. In the first half of the 1990s, militant groups in Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia 
and Saudi Arabia waged terrorist campaigns against governments, which were 
brutally suppressed (Roshandel and Chadha, 2006: 20-26). Therefore, a number of 
groups and militants turned their focus on the ―far enemy‖ (Gerges, 2005), since 
―their states were too weak to defend their citizenry, but equally too strong to be 
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overtaken‖ (Mohamedou, 2007: 45). This approach led to the evolution of al-Qaeda 
to an armed political group bypassing the state, after it has ―concluded that given the 
current configuration of Arab politics, it is not possible to expect realistically the 
region‘s long-time-a-dying regimes to defend their populations‘ interests‖ 
(Mohamedou, 2007: 44). 
 
In a nutshell, the fin de siécle Middle East states had failed in a number of critical 
issues. Notwithstanding their survival in the second half of the century, they had 
little success in responding to their societies‘ needs. They kept the rhetoric, however 
virtually abandoned the Palestinian cause. The regime that claimed to be the 
custodian of the Muslim holy sites allowed non-Muslims set foot in the Holy Lands. 
They kept their societies in a repressive fashion, while constantly curbing political 
dissidents. Their shortcomings resulted in non-state groups emerging and having an 
increasing level of activity. Therefore they became an integral part of the Middle 
East system, especially after 1990.   
 
 
3.4. Assessment 
 
Contextualizing al-Qaeda is an important requirement for making sense of its 
political rationale, which is an important factor for al-Qaeda to formulate its 
strategy. Its political rationale enables al-Qaeda to assess current conditions, define 
its capabilities and limitations, and evaluate strengths and weaknesses of its enemy. 
The following chapter goes through the elements of al-Qaeda‘s political rationale.  
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While this study handles al-Qaeda as a transnational non-state armed group, 
mainstream approaches and analyses on al-Qaeda depicts it as a religious terrorist 
group. This approach limits the scope of analysis on al-Qaeda to a great extent. 
While terrorism is a mode and method for al-Qaeda in its struggle, the religious 
terrorism studies take it as the trademark of al-Qaeda. This study, however, does not 
neglect al-Qaeda‘s attacks against civilian targets, nor seeks to adopt an apologetic 
stance towards it. Rather, its approach places terrorism in a general framework that 
is needed to understand al-Qaeda and its strategy. 
 
The religious terrorism studies have limited the scope of al-Qaeda analysis to 
terrorism, and stripped al-Qaeda from a political character by pointing out the 
religious vocabulary that it uses. Despite all those deficiencies that the religious 
terrorism studies possess, the multiplicity of works on al-Qaeda since the 9/11 
Attacks at least provides an extensive collection of factual information regarding al-
Qaeda. That is why; this study relies on several pieces in religious terrorism studies 
that lay down a handful of factual information.  
 
By making use of the factual information provided by religious terrorism studies, 
this study lays the elements of the context that al-Qaeda has emerged in. That 
context provided al-Qaeda with a great deal of experience and insight, which would 
be useful in the 1990s, when the group was preparing for a conflict. The first-hand 
experience on the Afghan Jihad of numerous al-Qaeda members affirmed the utility 
of guerrilla warfare approach and boosted the morale of the mujahedeen in many al-
Qaeda militants‘ perspective. Believing that they bled the Soviet Union to death 
themselves, those fighters gained an immense self-confidence. In this context, their 
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local jihads in their respective home countries were repressed. Besides, at that point 
in which the Middle Eastern states seemed at the peak of their power, they were at 
their weakest period of their short history. Non-state as well as intra-state dynamics 
have eroded state‘s power in many areas. In the Middle East, the most severe 
repercussion was the de-legitimization of the current regimes through failure in 
social areas and the Palestinian question.  
 
Al-Qaeda‘s strategy was guided by the context it emerged from. Failures of the local 
jihads in the beginning of the 1990s indicated that single focused and national 
struggles were doomed to failure. The al-Qaeda leadership, therefore, ruled out the 
organizational structure that those failed groups adopted. The context remarked the 
importance of guerilla warfare strategy as well. The victory against the Soviet Union 
was the prime example in this sense. Besides, the improvement of communication 
technologies in the Arab world, where the nation-state identities are vulnerable 
against the all-encompassing Arab and Muslim identity, enabled al-Qaeda members 
from around the world to get into touch with each other in a simple way. The 
context, provided guidance, experience and insights that contributed to the 
formulation of the strategy. A sound understanding of al-Qaeda‘s strategy, thus, 
requires an important deal of insight into the historical and political context.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
THE STRATEGY OF AL-QAEDA AFTER 2001 
 
 
 
Although al-Qaeda‘s declaration of war was in 1996, the escalation of the conflict 
between al-Qaeda and the U.S.A. begins after September 11, 2001. Whereas George 
W. Bush has declared that the War on Terrorism starts with al-Qaeda but targets 
―every terrorist group of global reach‖, the actual practice since 2001 proves 
otherwise. America‘s engagement with some other terrorist groups has been 
reluctant to say the least. Therefore, the conflict between the U.S. and al-Qaeda 
forms the main axis in the Global War against Terrorism. America‘s initial success 
in this conflict matched with the invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan, therefore 
culminated in American grandiose plans for regime change in the Middle East. The 
initial front of the conflict in Afghanistan soon remained out of American focus. The 
invasion in Iraq consumed the American efforts and resources. Besides, the United 
States‘ increasing material presence in the Middle East only fueled resentment and 
injustice felt by the local population. It drew reaction and criticism not only from the 
Middle East but also from other parts of the world. Moreover, hopes for a solution 
to the Palestinian question sank low as the HAMAS faced Israeli and international 
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isolation when it won the elections of 2006. The conduct of the global war on 
terrorism by the United States led to a stalemate after al-Qaeda restored itself in this 
period. 
 
This chapter seeks to highlight the conduct of the current conflict by al-Qaeda. By 
deeming al-Qaeda a party to this conflict, this study dismisses the arguments posed 
by mainstream al-Qaeda and religious terrorism analyses posing it as an irrational 
cult of madmen utilising violence per se. Rather, the first section in this chapter is 
devoted to the political rationale beneath al-Qaeda‘s actions. The definition of its 
constituency and enemy, its reasons for going to war and the decisive factor of 
asymmetry are subjected to analysis in order to outline al-Qaeda‘s political 
rationale. Then the major elements of al-Qaeda‘s strategy after 2001, namely the 
communication element and the conduct of warfare will be handled.  
 
The following hypotheses that were presented in the introduction will be verified in 
this chapter: 
- The communication and the conduct of warfare are elements of Al-Qaeda‘s 
strategy in the post-September 11 period that compensated for the 
asymmetrical condition al-Qaeda faced.  
- Al-Qaeda‘s political rationale covers a significant place in its strategy under 
the post-2001 era conditions. 
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4.1. The Political Rationale 
 
4.1.1. Al-Qaeda’s Casus Belli 
 
Al-Qaeda‘s war against the United States of America and its terrorist attacks in this 
framework are assessed in very different ways. Considering that armed groups 
initiate in terrorist attacks for purposes of political change (Crenshaw, 1981: 379), it 
is a point of some concern in deliberating how al-Qaeda‘s use of violence relates to 
any political concerns. As such, the difficulty in formulating such a relation brought 
about different approaches such as Cronin‘s (2002/03) explanation, which was 
influenced by the religious terrorism literature, that puts ―religious terrorists engage 
in violent behavior directly or indirectly to please the perceived commands of a 
deity‖. Moreover, the overtly symbolic character of al-Qaeda attacks, especially the 
9/11 Attacks, led Mark Juergensmeyer to state that such spectacular attacks are to be 
seen as ―dramatic events‖ that are ―intended to impress for their symbolic 
significance‖, not as a tactic towards a strategic goal (Juergensmeyer, 2003: 125). 
Other explanations include Michael Doran‘s conviction that al-Qaeda sought to 
provoke the United States into a conflict in order to polarize the Islamic world and 
show the Muslims that their rulers are Western cronies (Doran, 2002). According to 
Gunaratna, the attacks were against the American economic, political and military 
power (Gunaratna, 2003: 67). And for Mohamedou, the September 11 Attacks was 
―a military act designed to surprise and gain the tactical and psychological upper 
hand‖ (Mohamedou, 2007: 64). As far as the al-Qaeda leadership was concerned, 
the recurrent theme is reciprocation. Osama bin Laden states in his October 2001 
address that ―What the United States tastes today is a very small thing compared to 
what we have tasted for tens of years.‖ In another statement in November 2002, he 
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puts that ―reciprocal treatment is part of justice‖ and remarks that their attacks are 
only ―reactions and reciprocal actions‖ against what he deems as aggression by the 
United States. Yet in 2004, Osama bin Laden reveals that after he reflected on ―the 
oppression and tyranny of the American/Israeli coalition‖ in Palestine and Lebanon, 
he concluded that they should ―punish the aggressor‖ as a warning and deterrent.  
 
As stated above, the al-Qaeda leadership depicts the terrorist attacks against the U.S. 
as a reciprocation. It considers itself in a war with America and it initiates attacks in 
this framework. As the word ―reciprocation‖ suggests a pattern of mutual attacks, it 
is important to point out towards the background that causes al-Qaeda to declare 
war. Osama bin Laden issued a statement in August 1996, titled ―Declaration of 
War Against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places‖. In this 
document, grievances against America and the Saudi regime is strongly remarked. 
Considering the fact that Osama bin Laden was a Saudi citizen prior to 1994, and he 
was in contact with the Saudi dissidents opposing the regime and the U.S. forces in 
Saudi Arabia, the document of 1996 includes many convictions against King Fahd‘s 
regime as well. Nevertheless, Osama bin Laden‘s focus on the ―Crusading 
Americans‖ takes a bigger place in the document. Bin Laden echoes Ibn Taymiyya 
of the 13th century and calls for action against ―the Great Kufr‖ along with ―the 
Kufr‖ that is the local rulers. Bin Laden considers the Saudi regime as a puppet of 
America, which he considers as the invader of the holy lands, as well as responsible 
for many wrongs in the Middle East. Therefore, he sums up those wrongs as 
follows: 
It should not be hidden from you that the people of Islam had suffered from 
aggression, iniquity and injustice imposed on them by the Zionist-Crusaders 
alliance and their collaborators; to the extent that the Muslims blood became 
the cheapest and their wealth as loot in the hands of the enemies. Their blood 
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was spilled in Palestine and Iraq. The horrifying pictures of the massacre of 
Qana, in Lebanon are still fresh in our memory. Massacres in Tajikistan, 
Burma, Cashmere, Assam, Philippine, Fatani, Ogadin, Somalia, Eritrea, 
Chechnya and in Bosnia-Herzegovina took place, massacres that send 
shivers in the body and shake the conscience. All of this and the world watch 
and hear, and not only didn't respond to these atrocities, but also with a clear 
conspiracy between the USA and its allies and under the cover of the 
iniquitous United Nations, the dispossessed people were even prevented 
from obtaining arms to defend themselves. 
 
Osama bin Laden‘s concerns, therefore, can be attributed to a greater scale than the 
mere opposition to the regime in Saudi Arabia. He mentions not only the half-a-
century old Palestinian question and the recent Gulf War of 1991 and its aftermath, 
and also he remarks the incidents, in which he considered the Muslims are facing 
aggression carried out with the direct or indirect U.S. complicity. Two years later in 
February 23, 1998, another statement was published, this time by al-Qaeda and a 
number of other organizations. It was titled ―World Islamic Front Statement: Jihad 
Against Jews and Crusaders‖ and signed by Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri 
of the Egyptian Jihad Group, Abu-Yasir Rifa'i Ahmad Taha of the Egyptian Islamic 
Group, Shaykh Mir Hamzah of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Pakistan and Fazlur Rahman 
of the Jihad Movement in Bangladesh. This document remarks the following points: 
First, for over seven years the United States has been occupying the lands of 
Islam in the holiest of places, the Arabian Peninsula, plundering its riches, 
dictating to its rulers, humiliating its people, terrorizing its neighbors, and 
turning its bases in the Peninsula into a spearhead through which to fight the 
neighboring Muslim peoples. 
If some people have in the past argued about the fact of the occupation, all 
the people of the Peninsula have now acknowledged it. The best proof of this 
is the Americans' continuing aggression against the Iraqi people using the 
Peninsula as a staging post, even though all its rulers are against their 
territories being used to that end, but they are helpless. 
Second, despite the great devastation inflicted on the Iraqi people by the 
crusader-Zionist alliance, and despite the huge number of those killed, which 
has exceeded 1 million... despite all this, the Americans are once against 
trying to repeat the horrific massacres, as though they are not content with 
the protracted blockade imposed after the ferocious war or the fragmentation 
and devastation. 
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So here they come to annihilate what is left of this people and to humiliate 
their Muslim neighbors. 
Third, if the Americans' aims behind these wars are religious and economic, 
the aim is also to serve the Jews' petty state and divert attention from its 
occupation of Jerusalem and murder of Muslims there. The best proof of this 
is their eagerness to destroy Iraq, the strongest neighboring Arab state, and 
their endeavor to fragment all the states of the region such as Iraq, Saudi 
Arabia, Egypt, and Sudan into paper statelets and through their disunion and 
weakness to guarantee Israel's survival and the continuation of the brutal 
crusade occupation of the Peninsula.  
 
These points reflect insecurities not only perceived by individuals considered to be 
on the fringes of the Middle Eastern societies, but also circulated through the press, 
political activists, political leaders even statesmen, public opinion leaders; therefore 
it constitutes a major part of the Middle East public opinion regarding the U.S. 
position in the Middle East. A recent opinion poll conducted by Gallup on the U.S. 
image in Middle East/North Africa reveals that the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq would 
be a major step for enhancing the U.S. image.
2
 This result stresses the significance 
of the way that the U.S. military presence in the Middle East is being considered. In 
the statements quoted above and in many other messages, the al-Qaeda leadership 
recurrently refers to the elements of American Middle East policy and the sense of 
injustice and victimhood invoked by those issues.  Therefore, al-Qaeda grounds its 
activism on perceived insecurities in the Muslim world and the Middle East. While 
concerns for the American policies in the Middle East are shared by various other 
groups, al-Qaeda has adopted to approach those concerns in a regional and 
transnational sense and respond in a global reach. The regional states are no longer 
able or willing to make a progress on amending those insecurities; al-Qaeda, 
therefore, bypasses the state (Mohamedou, 2007: 44) and engages both the local 
rulers and foreign presence in the Middle East.  
 
                                                 
2
 The report of the poll is available at http://www.gallup.com/poll/114007/opinion-briefing-image-
middle-east-north-africa.aspx, as of June 10, 2010. 
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It is also a fact that the United States has been involved in Middle Eastern crises in a 
rising scale for the last two decades of the 20th century. From 1980 to 2001, 
America engaged in 102 military operations abroad, and 29 of them is in the Middle 
East, ranging from Libya to Iran. The most striking of those operations are 
Operation Desert Storm, Desert Shield and Desert Fox and the enforcing no-fly 
zones in Iraq, the bombing of Afghanistan and Sudan in 1998, and the deployment 
of U.S. troops to Somalia. While the U.S. reasons might differ according to the 
instance, al-Qaeda depicted them as aggressions against the Muslim world. The 
American operations in the onset of the 1990s started the extensive American 
military presence in the region, which at times initiated in offensive operations, as 
mentioned. Besides, al-Qaeda considers the U.S. as responsible for the state of 
affairs in the Palestinian Question and the oppressive nature of the local regimes due 
to its support for Israel and the Arab states, especially Egypt and Saudi Arabia. The 
Palestine issue has been a concern for a wide range of political groups and 
ideologies from the Arab nationalism and Baathism to the Political Islam. For the al-
Qaeda leadership, the U.S. is responsible for the plight of the Palestinians through 
its support of the Israeli occupation.  
  
In the interview by Peter Arnett of the CNN in March 1997, Osama bin Laden puts 
forward a very clear picture of the situation and concludes that because of the U.S. 
presence in Saudi Arabia, and aggressive American policies that shows its 
―arrogance, haughtiness and transgression of all bounds that is not witnessed before 
by any power in the world‖, they have declared war on the United States. The al-
Qaeda leadership, therefore, laid the grounds for their casus belli on the American 
foreign policy towards the Middle East. In this framework, certain grievances and 
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points, some of which may as well be regarded as the U.S. scapegoating, led al-
Qaeda to start the engagement with America in a transnational and global scale, for 
the aim of driving the U.S. from the Middle East. At this point, the assessment of the 
extent that al-Qaeda‘s concerns about the U.S. presence, is irrelevant. Those 
concerns are built on a perspective that is common in the Middle East as the polls 
suggest. Therefore, it is a political decision on the part of al-Qaeda, whether to go to 
war for those concerns. Its leadership clearly puts forward the arguments, which are 
all related to the Middle Eastern politics. Al-Qaeda‘s decision and reasons for going 
to war reflects the general trend in the post-Cold War world, in which non-state 
actors substitute state actors in some aspects.  
 
 
4.1.2. The Constituency  
 
Robert Fisk, in his interview with Osama bin Laden in July 1996, rejects his analogy 
between Europeans resisting German occupation in the Second World War and al-
Qaeda fighting against the U.S. on historical and moral grounds. He contends that 
―the Americans have never murdered a single Saudi‖. The ordinary mindset that 
Fisk exemplifies faces difficulties in interpreting the transboundary identification in 
the Middle East, especially among the Arabs. When the al-Qaeda leadership 
mentions the injustices harbored against the Muslims, they act on the transboundary 
identification of the Muslim nation, i.e. the Muslim Ummah, regardless of state 
frontiers. Likewise, Palestine holds a distinctive place in Osama bin Laden‘s 
rhetoric, not only because of the prospects of raising support among the Palestinians 
but also due to the centrality of the Palestinian cause in the Arab mind throughout 
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the 20
th
  century. While the statements of al-Qaeda in the onset of its war against the 
U.S. focus on the American presence in Saudi Arabia, i.e. the Holy Lands, al-
Qaeda‘s reasons for going to war are by no means limited to the Arabian Peninsula. 
Therefore, when an al-Qaeda statement mentions the American invasion of Muslim 
lands, it goes beyond the direct American presence in Saudi Arabia and 
encompasses the indirect responsibility of the U.S. in Palestine through Israel, and 
in other Muslim countries through its support of the apostate regimes.  
 
The constituency concept covers the scope of both the geographical extent that is the 
subject of the concerns, the strategic depth and the extent of the objectives. The al-
Qaeda leadership defines its territorial constituency as the Muslim world, including 
all the countries that Muslims indigenously inhabit. Osama bin Laden and other top 
figures make reference to the Islamic nation as a whole. The al-Qaeda leadership is 
concerned about the insecurities and injustice caused by the U.S. behaviour and 
policies in the Islamic world, which includes non-Arab regions as well. The Afghan 
Jihad in the 1980s and al-Qaeda‘s relationship with Taliban and Kashmiri groups 
underscored the inclusion of South Asia for al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda contacts and 
affiliates in Africa and Southeast Asia show that the al-Qaeda leadership considers 
its territorial constituency wide enough to cover those places. They consider the 
American presence in any part of the Islamic nation as an aggression against the 
Muslim people, regardless of ethnicity, country of origin and state borders. This 
transboundary identification of al-Qaeda with the Islamic nation as a whole owes to 
the original understanding of the Muslim ummah in the Middle East. The Islam 
religion, which ―understands itself in universalist terms‖ (Mandaville, 2007: 276) 
regards the issues of nationality, ethnicity and race insignificant when compared to 
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the identification with Islam. Whereas the wide range of the expansion of Islam 
prevented the Muslim transnationalism to refer to a single political entity, there has 
existed a potential towards that (Mandaville, 2007: 277). The transnational character 
was further reinforced when the European superiority imposed itself upon the 
Islamic world and the Muslim lands came to fold under Western dominance. 
Western dominance and superiority served as a ―Christian other‖, reminded the 
Crusades in the medieval times and therefore came to be regarded in all-
encompassing civilizational terms. However, the transnational identification 
suffered setbacks in the beginning of the 20th century, when the Caliphate was 
abolished and the resistance against the Western superiority included nationalist 
elements (Mandaville, 2007: 279). The particular state identities that were 
developed throughout the formation of Middle Eastern states are important; however 
the idea of the Arab nationalism, in line with the Ummah understanding, came to 
encompass more than mere particular identification with the territorial state. In this 
sense, the Arab nationalism of the mid-20th century carried elements from the 
Ummah identity, therefore included transboundary elements, albeit restricted to the 
Arab identity. In this process, the onset of the conflict between the Arabs and Israel 
from 1948 onwards served as a cause among the Arabs and even among the 
Muslims from all around the world that involved a sense of commonality beyond 
borders. 
 
The period in which al-Qaeda has crystallized represents a significant rise in Muslim 
transnationalism. This phenomenon rests on the ummah identity from the past 
carried throughout the 20
th
 century by common causes in the Muslim world. On this 
background, important factors contribute to the concept of the Muslim Ummah or 
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nation in Osama bin Laden‘s rhetoric. First of all, the repressive character of 
particular states coupled with their inability in providing security and welfare to 
their societies reduced the appeal of particular state identities and nationalism. This 
point is related to the legitimacy crises of states, mentioned in the previous chapter. 
Second, the Political Islam has begun to spread its influence throughout the Muslim 
world as a political alternative. While many Islamist groups adopted a local agenda 
within the borders of their respective states, existence of groups such as al-Qaeda 
and Hizb-ut-Tahrir (Mandaville, 2007: 265) put forward political agendas bypassing 
current borders. Third, the globalization process that is involved with the greater use 
of travel and communications technologies, ―bring far-flung corners of the Muslim 
world into greater contact with each other‖ (Mandaville, 2007: 299). Therefore, the 
advantages of globalization reinforce the sense of awareness and identification with 
a global entity. Lastly, actual developments in the Muslim world contributed to the 
Ummah awareness. A landmark event in this sense is the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan. The Afghan Jihad included fighters from all around the Muslim world, 
and its success raised awareness and concerns for their crises involving Muslims, 
such as Bosnia, Chechnya, Kashmir, Palestine, Lebanon and Iraq.  
 
Al-Qaeda‘s definition of its constituency as the whole Islamic world implies that it 
considers the geographic extent not only as the scope of its grievances but also as 
the scope of its operational conduct. Therefore, such an approach enables al-Qaeda 
to capitalize on its database of contacts throughout the Muslim world that Osama 
bin Laden had created during its efforts in the Maktab al Khidamat in the Afghan 
jihad. In this way, al-Qaeda is able to benefit from its human resources in a more 
advantageous way. The enlarged operational area of conduct, supported by al-Qaeda 
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contacts in various countries enables al-Qaeda conduct a guerrilla warfare strategy 
on the elements of ―dispersion, concentration and constant change of position‖ (Mao 
Tse Tung, 1989). In the face of asymmetrical pressure from the U.S. al-Qaeda had to 
dismantle its concentration in Afghanistan and disperse in a geographical setting. 
This was made possible by the definition of the Islamic world as al-Qaeda‘s 
constituency, which both makes the defensive dispersing approach possible and 
causes the adversary to over-extend its defensive capabilities; thus enabling al-
Qaeda to probe for weaknesses.  The idea of Muslim nation as al-Qaeda‘s 
constituency contributes to its strategic depth from another point as well. Al-
Qaeda‘s infiltration among the Muslim expatriates through Islamic NGOs and 
charity organizations is well known and claimed to provide strategic depth to al-
Qaeda in the Western countries (Gunaratna, 2003: 9). To some extent, this is made 
possible by the ―meaning-making and identity constitutive‖ effect that the idea of a 
Muslim nation has over the Western Muslims (Mandaville, 2007: 263). The Western 
Muslims, who share a dual identity experience, such as the second generation 
migrants are considered having ―an apparent tension between being, for example, 
simultaneously both British and South Asian‖ (Mandaville, 2007: 263). The idea of 
a Muslim nation, therefore, relieves such a tension, and empowers the individual 
through detaching him/her from its current society. Al-Qaeda‘s adoption of the 
whole Muslim nation as its constituency, thus, grants it the opportunity to address 
those migrants in a meaningful way.  
 
As far as al-Qaeda‘s objective of ending the U.S. military presence and aggression 
in the Muslim world is concerned, its wider constituency represents the rationale 
that al-Qaeda has adopted in its current engagement with a superior force. That 
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rationale is reflected in the debates that reflects a turning point in al-Qaeda‘s history. 
Abdullah Azzam, who provided the theoretical guidance during its formative years 
in the 1980s, was in favor of limiting the efforts to build an Islamic state in 
Afghanistan. Whereas, Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri argued for 
utilizing the experience and potential gained during the Afghan Jihad to pursue a 
transnational agenda, covering the whole Muslim world. With the assassination of 
Abdullah Azzam, bin Laden and al-Zawahiri‘s approach gained prominence in al-
Qaeda‘s historical course. Abdullah Azzam‘s vision of al-Qaeda as ―an organization 
that would channel the energies of mujahidin into fighting on behalf of oppressed 
Muslims worldwide‖ (Gunaratna, 2003: 29) required al-Qaeda, under the 
circumstances of being the weak actor in a possible asymmetrical conflict, to adopt a 
guerrilla warfare strategy that argued for dispersal rather than concentration. 
Azzam‘s ideas of revolution in one country, thus, were risky as they would expose 
the organization to the possible utilization of immense destructive power by the 
U.S.A. Osama bin Laden‘s wider approach of engagement in the whole of the 
constituency favored its guerrilla warfare strategy in a regional scale.  
 
Since al-Qaeda is engaged the American presence in the Middle East, the nature of 
the U.S. presence required al-Qaeda to have a wider constituency. The U.S. 
presence in the Middle East implies the American influence, that al-Qaeda opposes, 
in a transboundary scale. The American military bases in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf 
provided the U.S. with the potential to project its power in Iraq, the Arabian 
Peninsula, the Persian Gulf and Iran. This potential was already realized in Iraq in 
the operations Desert Storm, Desert Fox and Iraqi Freedom. Besides, the American 
military presence in the Mediterranean, which is at the periphery of the Muslim 
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world, through the Incirlik base in Turkey and the U.S. Sixth Fleet based in Italy 
gives the U.S. the power projection ability over the Mediterranean coasts of the 
Muslim world. This situation was realized in the U.S. engagement with Libya and 
military operations in Lebanon in the 1980s. Moreover, from the al-Qaeda 
perspective, it implies the liaison of America and Israel, which threatens Palestine 
and Lebanon. Therefore, for al-Qaeda, who engaged an adversary with 
transboundary power projection capability, needs a wider constituency for its 
objective of driving out the U.S. presence. 
 
The definition of the constituency by al-Qaeda reflects its rationale through the 
selection and employment of its general strategic choice, and through the audience it 
addresses.. Al-Qaeda conducts its engagement with the U.S. with a guerilla warfare 
approach. This approach requires a wider constituency to employ much needed 
strategic depth against the U.S. Moreover, its casus belli is based on the U.S. 
military presence in the Middle East, which has a transboundary power projection 
capability. Having analyzed the background and the spatial dimension of al-Qaeda‘s 
political rationale, the next sub-section will evaluate al-Qaeda‘s choice of tactical 
moves. 
 
 
4.1.3. Asymmetry and Terrorism 
 
The current conflict between the U.S. and al-Qaeda has an asymmetrical nature. The 
asymmetry first and foremost is obvious in conventional military capabilities of the 
parties to the conflict. The power disparities between the adversaries have an 
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extreme quality. That is the al-Qaeda fighters face a superior military power, 
endowed with technological sophistication that has transcended its predecessors as 
the hegemonic power. Besides, the asymmetrical nature has a qualitative nature that 
is status asymmetry (Stepanova, 2008: 19). It implies that the sides in the conflict 
are actors of different status, and fits the conflict between the U.S. as the state actor 
and al-Qaeda as the non-state actor. The nature of the asymmetry in the conflict 
between the U.S. and al-Qaeda includes ideological disparity as well, which is to the 
advantage of al-Qaeda. It endows al-Qaeda with a power of mobilization and 
indoctrination through its radical ideology, therefore enables it to acquire a more 
efficient way of utilizing its human resources (Stepanova, 2008: 21).  
 
From the time of the declaration of war, the al-Qaeda leadership is aware of the 
imbalance of forces in this conflict. In the statement of declaration of war in 1996, 
Osama bin Laden mentions the situation in terms of military disparity and outlines 
the general framework for actual engagement with their enemy:  
Today your brothers and sons, the sons of the two Holy Places, have started 
their Jihad in the cause of Allah, to expel the occupying enemy from of the 
country of the two Holy places. And there is no doubt you would like to 
carry out this mission too, in order to re-establish the greatness of this 
Ummah and to liberate its' occupied sanctities. Nevertheless, it must be 
obvious to you that, due to the imbalance of power between our armed forces 
and the enemy forces, a suitable means of fighting must be adopted i.e using 
fast moving light forces that work under complete secrecy. In other word to 
initiate guerrilla warfare, were the sons of the nation, and not the military 
forces, take part in it. And as you know, it is wise, in the present 
circumstances, for the armed military forces not to be engaged in a 
conventional fighting with the forces of the crusader enemy (the exceptions 
are the bold and the forceful operations carried out by the members of the 
armed forces individually, that is without the movement of the formal forces 
in its conventional shape and hence the responses will not be directed, 
strongly, against the army) unless a big advantage is likely to be achieved; 
and great losses induced on the enemy side (that would shaken and destroy 
its foundations and infrastructures) that will help to expel the defeated enemy 
from the country. 
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Bin Laden is clear on the futility and self-destructiveness in fighting a conventional 
war against America. He, therefore, points out the necessity of utilizing ―fast 
moving light forces that work under complete secrecy‖. This approach suits the 
general strategy of guerilla warfare that he puts forward. Fast moving, light forces 
are required to implement the dispersal of forces in within the constituency and the 
indirect approach that is evident in bin Laden‘s call to avoid conventional 
confrontation  is an indispensible element in any strategy that is to be followed when 
facing materially superior enemies (Hart, 2002: 281-288).  
 
Within the confines of al-Qaeda‘s strategic approach, terrorism takes place as a 
tactical and operational choice. However, as a part of the misunderstandings and 
misrepresentations of al-Qaeda, terrorism came to be regarded as its main 
operational venue. Such fallacies stripped al-Qaeda‘s terrorist tactics of their part in 
its overall strategic approach. Moreover, such a focus on terrorism is well misplaced 
because in analytical context, it represents nothing except being a method of 
conflict. It is without doubt that this is not to say studies in terrorism have no 
relevance to international security. Rather, the position adopted here is that terrorism 
should not be detached from its overall political context for the sake of relevance in 
the international security studies. For al-Qaeda, who is determined to fight foreign 
presence in the Muslim world for establishing a polity along the lines of their 
ideology, resorting to terrorism implies ―a strategic reaction to the absence of 
military reciprocity in its war with the United States, as well as the asymmetrical 
evolution of methods of war-fighting‖ (Mohamedou, 2007: 77). The logic behind al-
Qaeda‘s preference for terrorism is clear in Abu Musab al Suri‘s analysis, who is a 
significant theorist within the ranks of al Qaeda. In his book ―The Global Islamic 
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Resistance Call‖3 he reviewed ―the ways and methods of jihad during the Jihadi 
current (1963-2001)‖ and considers that the standards of the time has fundamentally 
changed and this change made the old methods of confrontation obsolete (Lia, 2008: 
357). Therefore, he moves on to ―design a method of confrontation, which is in 
accordance with the standards of the present time‖ (Lia, 2008: 359). Al-Suri 
deserves particular attention, because he adopts a style of strategic thinking based on 
the lessons from the past and building on the careful analysis of the present in a 
purely secular way. After analyzing the current conditions at the time of his writing 
in 2004 that are the points he derived from the display of American military might, 
he concludes that:  
.. the basic axis of the Resistance‘s military activity against America and her 
allies now, must lie within the framework of ‗light guerilla warfare‘, ‗civilian 
terror‘ and secret methods, especially on the level of individual operations 
and small Resistance units completely and totally separated from each other. 
(Lia, 2008: 373) 
 
Based on this conclusion, Al-Suri discusses two viable options for a method of 
confrontation with their enemies: ―the Open Front Jihad‖ and ―Individual Terrorism 
Jihad‖ (Lia, 2008: 374-419). Al-Suri is steadfast in emphasizing the necessity of 
adopting ―Individual terrorism jihad‖ as a strategic choice. Under the condition of 
power disparity, Al-Suri prefers terrorism to open front approach because, ―the 
presence of the enemy over a wide area makes harder for battle fronts to emerge‖ 
and the advanced technology of the enemy ―declines the open front approach and 
confrontation from permanent positions‖ (Lia, 2007: 391-392). Al-Suri, also, 
evaluates terrorism as a strategy for deterring the allies of America. He studies the 
March 2004 attack in Spain as ―a case study of the political impact of military 
deterrence‖ (Lia, 2008: 416). Abu Musab al-Suri‘s influence on the higher ranks of 
                                                 
3
 A lengthy piece of excerpts from al-Suri‘s book (originally in Arabic) is presented in ―Architect of 
Global Jihad: The Life of Al-Qaida Strategist Abu Mu‘sab al-Suri‖ by Brynjar Lia. 
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the al-Qaeda leadership is not clear to the full extent; however, it is possible to claim 
that his approach clearly fits into the general outlines that Osama bin Laden 
provided in his declaration of war in 1996. Besides, the U.S. government presented 
a $5 million reward for information leading to his arrest, which might indicate his 
position within al-Qaeda.  
 
The lack of military balance limits the options for al-Qaeda to act in accordance 
with its ―reciprocal treatment‖ policy against the U.S. and its allies in the Middle 
East. Osama bin Laden has repeatedly emphasized this point: ―Just as you kill, you 
will be killed. Just as you bomb you will be bombed‖ (November 2002), ―What 
happened on 11 September and 11 March is your goods returned to you‖ (April 
2004). The reciprocal treatment, and depicting terrorist attacks as ―reaction‖ are 
common themes in Osama bin Laden‘s statements. For him, as long as the U.S. 
presence is the Middle East persists, al-Qaeda will continue its war through similar 
attacks. He constantly mentions recent incidents in which Muslim civilians are 
harmed or killed, thus he states that al-Qaeda attacks are reactions to the aggression 
by the U.S. Therefore, terrorist attacks constitute a way for al-Qaeda to carry on its 
conduct of warfare and deny the moral superiority of its enemy through claiming 
that its terrorist attacks carry the same character as the U.S. policies in the Middle 
East. The al-Qaeda leadership seek to limit the negative effects of spectacular al-
Qaeda attacks that cause civilian and Muslim casualties by reminding and 
emphasizing the atrocities that are claimed to be committed by America and Israel 
in the Middle East.  
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The employment of terrorism as a strategic choice reflects a rational decision on the 
part of al-Qaeda. This decision foremost, reflects the assessment of the asymmetry 
between itself and America in military capability. From the onset of the war to al-
Suri‘s analysis in 2004, the current assessment prevailed and directed al-Qaeda‘s 
efforts. The individual cells within al-Qaeda‘s constituency and among the Muslim 
expatriates in the West carried out a string of attacks: the first World Trade Center 
bombing (1993), the bombing of a Saudi-American base in Riyadh (1995), the 
assault on the al-Khobar towers that the U.S. forces inhabited (1996), the bombing 
of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania (1998), the attack on the USS Cole 
warship in Aden, Yemen (2000).  Within the confines of its guerilla warfare 
strategy, its terrorist attacks relate to goals of defeating the U.S. and driving it out of 
the Muslim world. It is irrelevant to discuss that engaging in a war with the U.S. as 
the sole super power in the world make sense in a rational manner. The fact that al-
Qaeda went to war with the U.S. does not indicate a distance to rational analysis on 
the part of its leadership. Having considered the case of Vietnam, the U.S. 
withdrawal from Lebanon in 1983 and from Somalia in 1995, both of which follow 
deadly attacks against American forces, the al-Qaeda leadership is resolute in their 
analysis that engaging in a similar style of warfare that encompasses both the whole 
of the Muslim world and the West when the opportunity presents itself, would yield 
themselves victory.  
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4.2. The Communication Element 
 
This subsection develops on the argument that communication has been an integral 
part of al-Qaeda‘s strategy from the onset of the conflict on, and even more so in the 
post-9/11 period. In that period, the world received statements by al-Qaeda 
leadership that addressed its followers, the Muslims and the Western publics. 
Besides the statements, the al-Qaeda leadership has issued threats, offered 
explanations and legitimizations and even engaged in discussions about their violent 
methods. In the meantime, both Western and Middle East media had shown interest 
in al-Qaeda, while research centers, both official and unofficial was established in 
order to evaluate al-Qaeda‘s communication strategy, such as The Search for 
International Terrorist Entities (SITE) Intelligence Group, the Nine Eleven Finding 
Answers Foundation (NEFA), and the Intelligence Summit.  
 
It has been mentioned that, since the beginning of the conflict in 1996, the al-Qaeda 
leadership developed an interest in publicity and communication. A report prepared 
in January 2004 by Foreign Broadcast Information Service,
4
 a component of the 
Central Intelligence Agency, which is marked for official use only, compiled al-
Qaeda statements from 1994 to 2004. Among the eighty seven media appearances 
that the report compiled, fifty two of them (13 interviews, 39 statements and 
messages) were dated before September 2001, and thirty five appearances (2 
interviews, 33 statements and messages) were after September 2001.  Before 2001, 
interviews with Osama bin Laden counted a high number compared to the period 
after 2001, which is quite natural, considering the disappearance of bin Laden. 
                                                 
4
 The report is available for downloading on http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/ladin.htm, as of July 
2010. 
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Among the interviewers, notable journalists and media organs such as Robert Fisk, 
Peter Bergen, Peter Arnett, CNN, Times, ABC, CBS, The Independent, take place, 
along with the Middle Eastern and Arabic media organs and journalists. The 
interviews‘ content are comprehensive and Osama bin Laden expresses al-Qaeda‘s 
position in a convenient way. In this period, Osama bin Laden has just started al-
Qaeda‘s engagement with the U.S., and he sought publicity in order to draw 
attention from both Middle Eastern and Western publics. He acquired the attention 
he sought after the 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. 
Statements and messages in this period include contents such as reemphasizing the 
call for jihad, responding to particular events, statements and accusations, delivering 
specific messages to specific audiences, praising attacks against America and 
undertaking responsibility for certain attacks. Those statements and messages 
ensured Osama bin Laden‘s place on the public and media agenda and therefore 
contributed to al-Qaeda‘s reputation and through spectacular attacks, its notoriety.  
 
With those concerns at hand, the communication practice of al-Qaeda involved the 
excessive usage of the internet. According to the The 2006 National Strategy for 
Combating Terrorism, ―The Internet provides an inexpensive, anonymous, 
geographically unbounded, and largely unregulated virtual haven for terrorists‖, and 
al-Qaeda is no exception. Most of the al-Qaeda communications materials are 
distributed online, from websites, who share or at lease sympathetic to al-Qaeda‘s 
worldview, as well as the Al Jazeera Network. Gabriel Weimann, who studied the 
internet usage by terrorist groups, puts that ―The great virtues of the Internet—ease 
of access, lack of regulation, vast potential audiences, fast flow of information, and 
so forth—have been turned to the advantage of groups committed to terrorizing 
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societies to achieve their goals‖ (Weimann, 2004: 11). David H. Gray‘s comparison 
shows that the use of the internet brings the same advantages as the territorial safe 
havens: ―fundraising, communications, training, recruiting, planning and logistics 
(Gray, 2009: 399). Throughout the first decade of the 2000s, al-Qaeda benefited 
from internet usage in an efficient way, especially for its communications.  
 
 
4.2.1. The Importance and Utility of Communication 
 
As the figures that the FBIS report suggest, the media appearances of the al-Qaeda 
leadership has an upward trend after 2001. Between September 2001 and January 
2004, the al-Qaeda leadership transmitted thirty three messages compared to the 
thirty nine in the seven years from 1994 to 2001. With the September 11 Attacks 
and the onset of the War on Terror by America, the escalation of the conflict had a 
leap and this is evident in the proliferation of messages. This might suggest that al-
Qaeda‘s conduct of the conflict involves transmitting messages and statements 
through the usage of media. Before going through the place of media in al-Qaeda‘s 
war, it is necessary to review some particular conditions that endowed the media 
usage with an importance. As mentioned various times, the American invasion in 
Afghanistan destroyed the physical infrastructure of al-Qaeda in this country, which 
had negative effects on al-Qaeda in terms of its efforts in training, communication, 
indoctrination, and overall management. At this point, it is even claimed that those 
developments represented ―the last vestiges of al-Qaeda‖ (Ranstorp, 2002). Amidst 
those events, in line with the War on Terrorism, America ensured the support of the 
most of the states in the international arena, including many states in the Middle 
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East, thus a restrictive international counter-terrorism environment challenged al-
Qaeda. As Middle Eastern and European states, under the U.S. influence, hardened 
their stance on counter-terrorism, al-Qaeda found harder to disseminate its 
propaganda via the traditional means it used to utilize. These traditional means 
included the Islamic charities and NGOs in Europe and the Middle East (Gunaratna, 
2003: 8). They were useful to al-Qaeda for fundraising, recruitment and propagation 
of its worldview. After September 2001, these organizations were deprived of the 
convenient environment that they enjoyed, thus al-Qaeda has lost an important 
element of its periphery. As a result of those developments, al-Qaeda leaders had to 
rely more on the communication component of their strategy.  
 
 
4.2.2. Survival  
 
Four years after the American invasion of Afghanistan, in July 2005 Ayman al-
Zawahiri wrote in a letter to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in Iraq that I say to you: that we 
are in a battle, and that more than half of this battle is taking place in the battlefield 
of the media. And that we are in a media battle in a race for the hearts and minds of 
our Umma‖. Al-Zawahiri‘s words relate to a very significant aspect in al-Qaeda‘s 
war with America. The media battle that covered more than half of the war involved 
various concerns of al-Qaeda.  
 
Firstly, al-Qaeda had to insist its existence after the initial defeats in 2001 and 2002. 
It had to prove that the core groups that faced the American military might survived 
the ordeal and was carrying out its struggle. For the al-Qaeda leadership, this point 
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was important for both its friendly and hostile audiences. Especially in 2002, the al-
Qaeda leadership transmitted sixteen messages. A close number of messages and 
statements was only in 1998, when the World Islamic Front statement was published 
and the U.S. embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania took place. Through those 
statements and messages in 2002, Osama bin Laden denied victory to America, 
wowed to revenge the invasion of Afghanistan and proclaimed the continuation of 
the war. He emphasized that despite the American victories in the battles, it failed to 
reach its objectives of killing al-Qaeda and Taliban leadership and creating a 
centralized, stable polity in Afghanistan. Besides, the messages and statements in 
2002 addressed the Muslims as well. Osama bin Laden warned the Muslims about 
the length of the current engagement with America and reiterated the call for jihad. 
Moreover, the al-Qaeda leadership started its address towards the peoples of 
America and Europe in 2002, explaining them its own reasoning behind the war. 
Therefore, in the immediate period after the September 2001, al-Qaeda‘s emphasis 
towards communication coupled with its attacks in October 2002 in Yemen, Kuwait, 
and Bali against America and its allies ensured its existence after the initial defeats 
in 2001. 
 
 
4.2.3. Propaganda  
 
The American invasions in Afghanistan and Iraq provided al-Qaeda with a suitable 
environment for propaganda. The situation presented al-Qaeda with several 
opportunities  In al-Qaeda‘s worldview, the increased American presence in the 
Middle East through Afghanistan and Iraq would be regarded as a confirmation for 
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their claims regarding the Crusaders‘ war on Islam. Besides, the availability of 
graphic footage showing the American forces in various situations further reinforced 
al-Qaeda‘s claims. The occurrence of collateral damage or civilian casualties 
worsened the American image and gave impetus to claims of American atrocities in 
the Middle East. Those opportunities became an integral part of the al-Qaeda 
propaganda. Before 2001, the al-Qaeda messages reiterated the massacres in 
Lebanon and against the Palestinians, and the killings in Iraq due to the U.S. 
embargo and airstrikes. The increasing availability of such developments as a result 
of the increased American presence, therefore, fueled grievances against the U.S. 
Al-Qaeda found itself in a fertile territory for propagation. 
 
In order to capitalize on the propaganda opportunities presented after 2001 and 
2003, al-Qaeda needed to focus its efforts on communication. Al-Qaeda has never 
claimed to be or sought to be a mass movement; nonetheless it needs support from 
the Muslims. It seeks to spread its worldview regarding the Muslim rulers as 
apostates, and the Americans as the crusaders that seek elimination of Islam. The al-
Qaeda leadership has multiple times stressed their intentions to incite the umma 
against the local rulers and the Americans. Actually the incitement of the Muslim 
people is so important that it even has the potential of realizing the aim of driving 
the U.S. out of the Muslim world. At the least, it provides recruits for the 
diminishing ranks of al-Qaeda, thus further reinforcing al-Qaeda‘s human resources. 
According to Abdul Hameed Bakier, jihadi websites post materials explaining the 
virtues of joining the jihad and shows ways for enthusiasts on how to become a 
member of al-Qaeda (Bakier, 2008). Internet World Stats website provides the 
information that the internet usage in the Middle East has risen in almost 2000 
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percent in the 2000-2010 period, from 3,284,800 users in 2000 to 63,240,946 users 
in 2010. This tremendous rise indicates an increase in potential audience of al-
Qaeda through those websites that has been founded by al-Qaeda members or 
sympathizers. Although it may be very difficult in defining a number of websites 
publishing along al-Qaeda‘s worldview, the dynamic nature of the internet 
(Weimann, 2004: 2) and the anonymity it provides makes it a convenient medium 
for transmitting al-Qaeda‘s worldview and defining recruitment potentials.  
Therefore, al-Qaeda compensates for its inability in propaganda in physical world 
with a focus on conquering the minds of the Muslim people on the cyberspace. 
 
 
4.2.4. Conduct of the Confrontation 
 
Al-Qaeda‘s focus on communications after 2001 provides it an opportunity in an 
organizational aspect. The current conditions of international persecution against al-
Qaeda made the operational conduct of the core leadership through maintaining 
contacts a difficult process, since it was subjected to monitoring and interception, 
which could potentially have security repercussions. However decentralized and 
dispersed it might be, the core leadership felt the need for providing a strategic 
conduct of the confrontation. That involved the undertaking of responsibility for 
specific attacks, issuing further threats, and placing dispersed attacks over a wide 
area that seemed distant from each other in the overall strategic context of the 
confrontation with the U.S.  
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Al-Qaeda‘s terrorist tactics involve the usage of communication in a high degree. 
That is because, terrorist attacks, regardless of its immediate target communicates a 
message of the perpetrator to the entire world through the mass-media. Therefore, 
the acts of terrorism have a wide, even global audience, considering the utilization 
of internet in order to broadcast the message, where television access is not present 
or limited.  In this way, the perpetrator achieves its immediate goal of invoking fear 
and intimidation in its hostile audience. Besides, it demonstrates its power and 
capabilities to its friendly audience. Al-Qaeda‘s terrorist tactics are inspired from the 
attacks against the American forces that led to their withdrawal such as the attacks 
in Lebanon in 1987. Thus, in order to have their desired impact on the U.S. 
government, the attacks should be publicized. Consistent with al-Qaeda‘s goal that 
is the withdrawal of the U.S. troops, the coercive effect of terrorist attacks on both 
general public and the government is magnified through the media attention. When 
looking at the number of al-Qaeda statements over time it is seen that a streak of 
statements are issued after the attack. In those statements, the al-Qaeda leadership 
either takes responsibility, or praises the attack and conveys that much more attacks 
are to come unless the U.S. and its allies retreat from the Muslim lands. For 
instance, in 2002, al-Qaeda attacks took place in Bali, Kuwait, and Yemen against 
the U.S. and its allies. After that, al-Qaeda leadership transmitted three messages, 
one praising the attacks, the other two addressing the American and European 
peoples. Likewise in 1998, after the embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzanya, and 
the ruling by the World Islamic Front, the al-Qaeda leadership issued statements 
emphasizing the call to jihad.  
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It is a fact that al-Qaeda leaders have not yet created the impact on the U.S. public 
and the government that will lead them out of the Muslim world however, the al-
Qaeda statements in these period placed the attacks in a strategic context, and 
contributed to the war for the Muslim minds.  
 
 
4.2.5. Assessment 
 
The communication element in al-Qaeda‘s strategy involves the use of mass-media 
and internet with great efficiency and in an increasing trend. The al-Qaeda 
leadership continues to issue statements and messages, in which they respond to 
allegations, mourn for their lost comrades, threaten the U.S. and its allies, and 
present an evaluation of current developments. Besides Osama bin Laden, some 
other leaders and figures within al-Qaeda started to appear in video messages and 
statements as well. The Internet usage by al-Qaeda enabled the conveying of these 
messages. Besides, the presence and proliferation of pro-al-Qaeda websites, 
considering the rise of the internet usage in the Middle East, widened al-Qaeda‘s 
audience within its constituency. In this way, al-Qaeda acquired the opportunity to 
appeal to internet users, thus, it had the capacity to reach sympathizers. These 
factors contributed al-Qaeda‘s efforts to bypass the international restriction imposed 
upon it. The cyberspace, through its anonymity, lack of regulation, and opportunity 
to reach potentially a global audience, has enabled al-Qaeda to conduct its 
propaganda and engage in recruitment throughout its constituency, therefore it 
presented aş-Qaeda another element of strategic depth. Communication 
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complements al-Qaeda‘s use of force in compensating for the asymmetrical 
condition it faces (Bockstette, 2008: 5).  
 
 
4.3. The Conduct of the Warfare 
 
Warfare, i.e. the use of force, represents another integral part within al-Qaeda‘s 
strategy. Al-Qaeda‘s conduct of warfare, especially terrorist tactics that it 
prominently resorted to, generally attracted widespread attention. Especially with 
the September 11 Attacks, terrorism came to be the hallmark of al-Qaeda. Major 
attacks by al-Qaeda after 2001, such as the Madrid, London, Istanbul and Riyadh 
attacks further fueled this view.  
 
 
4.3.1. Analytical Pitfalls 
 
While looking through al-Qaeda‘s terrorist attacks in an international security 
perspective, it is useful to avoid certain distractions. Firstly, relying heavily on the 
religious rhetoric of al-Qaeda has the risk of moving away from a sober analysis. As 
the religious terrorism studies, that were examined in the second chapter, 
represented, such an approach came to portray al-Qaeda as an exotic entity, which is 
distinctively new and has the tendency to create catastrophic developments. This 
approach, then, magnified and inflated the threat posed by al-Qaeda to enormous 
levels and acquired the risk of reinforcing the official positions to depict the current 
conflict between al-Qaeda and the U.S. as a fight between good and evil. The speech 
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by George W. Bush on September 16, 2001, vowing to carry on ―the crusade‖ and 
―rid the world of the evil-doers‖ raises suspicions about the common points that the 
both sides of the conflict share.  Therefore, treating al-Qaeda as evildoers 
determined to kill on a mass scale, deprives al-Qaeda from any notion of strategic 
thinking. In this way, it is no longer possible to have anticipatory efforts on al-
Qaeda, because it acts on the commands of its deity, rather than according to a set of 
objectives. In line with this reasoning, the fact that al-Qaeda aims to defeat America 
in military sense and rout it out of the Muslim lands in order to establish a polity in 
its image can be regarded as rumblings of a madman, which simply go against the 
reality of the American superior military might. All those elements of the approach 
consequently means the rejection of the classical maxim of conflict, ―Know your 
enemy‖. after ten years of the intense American engagement in the Middle East, it 
could be argued whether the U.S. policies in the Middle East in this period was built 
on similar rejections and inefficient perspectives, given the current situation in Iraq, 
Afghanistan and against al-Qaeda. In short, the first distraction is the practice of 
focusing on religion and ignoring politics and strategy in dealing with al-Qaeda.  
 
The second distraction is upholding a perspective that involves a limited focus on 
terrorism in studying al-Qaeda. This view, while placing an emphasis on al-Qaeda‘s 
terrorist attacks, stresses only the destructive nature of those acts and ignores the 
message al-Qaeda tries to convey and addresses the strategic direction that al-Qaeda 
sought in an insufficient way. The targeting of civilians and the potential of the 
Weapons of Mass Destruction usage are important elements within this specific 
perspective. It has the risk to underrate the general pattern and strategic direction 
beneath the terrorist acts. In this way, terrorist acts could be analyzed as separate 
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and distinct events, while their interconnectedness within a general framework 
receives little attention. In order to grasp the security and political challenge of al-
Qaeda, this approach has to broaden its perspective and treat the terrorist acts by al-
Qaeda not as single, separate and distinct events, but as acts loaded with a message 
that goes beyond the immediate destructiveness, and interwoven within the political 
and security challenge that al-Qaeda poses in the Middle East.  
 
 
4.3.2. The Guerilla Warfare Approach 
 
4.3.2.1. Basic Characteristics of the Guerilla Warfare 
 
Al-Qaeda‘s conduct of warfare possess the characteristics of a guerilla warfare 
approach in a regional even a global scale upheld by a non-state actor without a 
physical territorial basis, under the conditions of power disparity and organizational 
covertness. In order to compensate for the asymmetry of the conflict in the areas of 
power and status, al-Qaeda resorts to the guerilla warfare approach, intended to wear 
down the American will to maintain its presence in the Muslim lands. Therefore, al-
Qaeda‘s attacks against both civilian and military targets are aimed at eroding the 
U.S. resolve by attacking in an unconventional and spectacular manner and causing 
casualties in large numbers as well as targeting the symbols of the American 
prominence. Al-Qaeda attacks take place in both regional and global scale. Its 
attacks in the Western countries intend to force policy decisions on the part of 
America and its allies. Although debates and doubts are well underway about what 
exactly al-Qaeda sought with the 9/11 Attacks, whether it was intended to provoke 
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America into confrontation in the Middle East  (Doran, 2002; Sedgwick; 2004) or it 
was an act within the ―cosmic war‖ understanding of al-Qaeda (Juergensmeyer, 
2003; Attias, 2004) or it was an act related to the religious mindset of al-Qaeda, 
imitating the Muslim prophet Muhammad‘s way of conducting warfare (Habeck, 
2004). Regardless of the debates, the actual facts show that the U.S. engaged in a 
confrontation in the Middle East, in Afghanistan and Iraq, which, despite initial 
successes, proved to be a stalemate. This situation indeed presented al-Qaeda with 
plentiful opportunities that are an anti-American atmosphere in the Middle East and 
an increasing American presence in the Muslim lands. Al-Qaeda‘s propaganda 
efforts and conduct of operations were boosted by these developments.  
 
As mentioned above, the guerilla warfare approach is an attempt at wearing down 
the will of America to continue its policies in the Muslim world. This point is 
stressed in al-Qaeda leaders‘ statements. For example, Abu Musab al-Suri states that 
―the jihad of individual or cell terrorism, using the methods of urban or rural guerilla 
warfare, is fundamental for exhausting the enemy and causing him to collapse and 
withdraw‖ (Lia, 2007: 371). Similarly, bin Ladin argues in November 2004 that  
All that we have to do is to send two mujahidin to the furthest point east to 
raise a piece of cloth on which is written al-Qaida, in order to make the 
generals race there to cause America to suffer human, economic, and 
political losses without their achieving for it anything of note other than 
some benefits for their private companies. (Al Jazeera, 2004) 
 
Osama bin Laden, who is an engineer himself, is adept at practical aspects of their 
war, rather than ideological or religious aspects. His focus on economy originates in 
both his practical tendencies and his experience against the Soviet Union. In the 
same speech in 2004, bin Laden reiterates their experience in ―using guerilla warfare 
and war of attrition‖ that ―bled Russia for 10 years‖. Building on the previous 
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experience, the focus of al-Qaeda includes drawing the U.S. into a war of attrition, 
in which its economy will be severely strangulated due to its increased 
commitments. Al-Qaeda‘s approach indeed turns the current conflict to a war of 
attrition, through denying the U.S. a decisive victory. 
 
Perhaps the most important aspect of the guerilla war approach is that it enabled al-
Qaeda to cheat death. Thus, it extended the conflict over a long period of time, 
dispelling pledges by George W. Bush that the al-Qaeda will be destroyed and its 
leaders will be brought to justice. Hence, at the end of 2009, Barack Obama kept 
uttering the same objectives of the U.S., in the speech that he outlined his 
Afghanistan strategy. It is impossible not to notice that after eight years, the war is 
still on and al-Qaeda avoids getting disrupted, dismantled and destroyed. From the 
initiation of the conflict by al-Qaeda in 1996, it is probable that its leadership has 
envisaged such a situation. Osama bin Laden‘s remarks that they need fast moving 
light forces operating in secrecy in a guerilla war that they would undertake signifies 
the resolute position adopted by the al-Qaeda leadership. Similarly, Abu Musab al-
Suri, after going through the reasons of militant groups‘ failure in the Arab 
countries, reiterates the need to learn from their mistakes and stresses that their 
―Tora Bora mentality has to end‖ (Lia, 2007: 359). Consistent with this¸ al-Qaeda‘s 
dispersion and disappearance after 2001 has provided that al-Qaeda could avoid a 
concentration of the U.S. force upon itself. In this respect, avoiding a decisive actual 
confrontation with the U.S. would make up for al-Qaeda‘s relative weakness against 
the U.S. military power. 
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The guerilla warfare approach that is presented here is prone to several 
specifications according to several authors (Ganor, 2002; Schmid, 2004). Ganor 
notes that the targeting issue has a definitive importance in branding an activity as 
terrorism or guerilla activity. For him, terrorist activity targets civilians, whereas if 
the attack targets military installations it is a guerilla activity (Ganor, 2002: 296). 
Ganor does not insist on clarifying a definition in this regard; obviously due to the 
fact that this represents a common pitfall in terrorism definition efforts. Rather he 
points out that, organizations ―engage in terrorism or in guerilla activities according 
to their own operative limitations or circumstances‖ (Ganor, 2002: 297). Schmid, 
however, refers to the legal groundwork in categorizing combatants. In his view, 
abiding by the rules of engagement within the Laws of War set by the Hague 
Regulations and the Geneva Conventions is a primary condition for any struggle to 
be defined as warfare, and the guerilla warfare is distinguished from terrorism in this 
respect (Schmid, 2004: 203-204). This contrasts with Chipman‘s view that ―within 
Mao‘s guerilla strategy, terrorism is a basic tactic‖ (Chipman, 2003: 166). The legal 
approach that Schmid espouses is related to the legitimization of the use of force. 
Al-Qaeda‘s rejection to abide by the Laws of War depends on its indifference 
towards the established legislation about the onset and conduct of war, i.e. Jus in 
Bello, Jus ad Bellum. While al-Qaeda‘s legitimization of its use of force depends on 
the religious aspect of its worldview, this does not mean that rejection of the current 
Laws of War is a defining factor in so-called religious terrorism of al-Qaeda. Rather, 
this pattern can be attributed to the ―metamorphosis of conflict‖ that characterized 
the birth of a ―fourth generation of war‖ (Mohamedou, 2007: 24). This phenomenon 
is directly linked to the loss of monopoly by nation-states over the legitimate use of 
force. The guerilla warfare approach with terrorist tactics is a result of the status 
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asymmetry of the conflict. There is no clear reason as to why al-Qaeda, as a non 
state actor in an environment in which the nation-states lose ground on the 
monopoly of violence, should abide by the Laws of War, since its legitimization of 
the violence rests on fundamentally different grounds.   
 
 
4.3.2.2. The Scale of the Guerilla Warfare 
 
The guerilla warfare that al-Qaeda wages is on almost a global scale. This issue 
provides a large area of confrontation for al-Qaeda. As it was mentioned, at the 
formation stages of al-Qaeda, Abdullah Azzam‘s ―revolution in one country 
approach‖ and Osama bin Laden‘s ―world revolution approach‖ competed for 
prominence. With Azzam‘s death, bin Laden‘s image has shaped the group‘s overall 
attitude. The large area of confrontation enables al-Qaeda to avoid facing the U.S. 
military power in a concentrated sense. Moreover, the dispersion of al-Qaeda‘s 
assets throughout the entirety of the confrontation area gave it an operational 
flexibility, which means that al-Qaeda could revise its operational priorities, and 
avoid or prefer actual engagement in a given space. The operational flexibility is 
bolstered by the de-centralized approach that al-Qaeda adopted, which prevents the 
operational process being bogged down in a rigidity (Mishal and Rosenthal, 2005: 
288).  
 
Al-Qaeda‘s dispersion of assets in a large constituency is made possible by al-
Qaeda‘s core cadre‘s relations with groups and movements that share al-Qaeda‘s 
worldview. The Afghan Jihad in the 1980s has already provided Osama bin Laden 
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with a number of contacts among the foreign fighters that have come to 
Afghanistan. Bin Laden‘s prestige amongst these foreign fighters has become an 
opportunity for him to capitalize on, after the foreign fighters returned to their 
respective countries.  
 
The presence of regional contacts and the disruption of al-Qaeda‘s sanctuary in 
Afghanistan led to a process in which the ‗mother al-Qaeda, al Qaeda al Oum‘, in 
Mohamedou‘s expression ‗encouraged the proliferation of mini-al-Qaedas‘ that are 
‗connected loosely‘ to the mother al-Qaeda (Mohamedou, 2007: 54). Gunaratna 
names those mini al-Qaedas as associate groups and specifies that ―While associate 
groups attack tactical targets, strategic targets are al-Qaeda‘s responsibility‖ 
(Gunaratna, 2003: 127). Besides, local groups affiliate themselves with al-Qaeda, 
given its ideological appeal and tendency to engage America in a geographically 
wide and diffuse area. For example, the Algerian groups the Groupe Islamique 
Armed (GIA) and the Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC: Groupe Salafiste 
pour la Prédication et el Combat) are significant associates of al-Qaeda, which 
enable it to operate in Europe (Gunaratna, 2003: 153). Other than the Algerian 
groups, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, the Abu Sayyaf Group and the Moro 
Islamic Liberation Front in the Philippines, Harkat-ul Mujahidin, Jaysh-e-
Muhammad, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba in Pakistan and Kashmir, the Tawhid group of Abu 
Musab al Zarqawi in Iraq, Jamaah Islamiyah in Indonesia and Taliban in 
Afghanistan are groups that are affiliated with al-Qaeda. Driven by al-Qaeda‘s 
ideological appeal, these groups benefit from the training and funding opportunities 
that al-Qaeda presents (Gunaratna, 2003: 222-292).  
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Through its affiliates and associates, al-Qaeda is endowed with sufficient assets to 
conduct the confrontation on a global scale. It provides a strategic framework for its 
associates‘ attacks and fits them into a general resistance against the U.S. incursion 
to the Muslim lands. This is evident in Osama bin Laden‘s praise of the several 
attacks in 2002, In that message of November 2002, Osama bin Laden states that  
The incidents that have taken place since the raids of New York and 
Washington until now -- like the killing of Germans in Tunisia and the 
French in Karachi, the bombing of the giant French tanker in Yemen, the 
killing of marines in Faylaka and the British and Australians in the Bali 
explosions, the recent operation in Moscow, and some sporadic operations 
here and there -- are only reactions and reciprocal actions.  
And he puts that attacks such as those will go on as long as the Western aggression 
in the Muslim lands persists. It is not known whether those attacks that bin Laden 
have mentioned are carried on with a full guidance and direction of the al-Qaeda 
core leadership, nor does it matter. Within the framework of the confrontation, the 
al-Qaeda leadership is adept at presenting all those attacks in a strategic perspective.  
 
 
4.3.2.3. Current Fronts of the Guerilla Warfare 
 
Since al-Qaeda‘s constituency is the lands where Muslims dwell, the current conflict 
between it and the U.S. takes place on an enormous geographical scale. Al-Qaeda 
has originally started the engagement with America not on a single line of offense or 
defense but on an entire theatre of operations. From 2001 on the conflict started to 
take a two-pronged aspect within this theatre. Beside terrorist attacks in both the 
Muslim lands and the West, actual fronts have been introduced to the conflict. After 
2003, insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan represented two main area of operations 
for al-Qaeda. Then, in 2007, Pakistan was added to those fronts.  
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Despite the disadvantages of an open engagement with the U.S., the presence of al-
Qaeda in those fronts is in consistence with al-Qaeda‘s guerilla warfare approach. In 
Abu Musab Al-Suri‘s analysis, the overt engagement of al-Qaeda in specific 
locations is dubbed as the Open Front Jihad. Al-Suri states that: 
While it is possible to perform individual Jihad anywhere in the Arab and 
Islamic world, even all over the world, because this is not dependent on 
certain conditions where it takes place, the Open Front Jihad (jihad al-jabahat 
al-maftuhah) is dependent on strategic preconditions that are necessary in 
order to succeed. (Lia, 2007: 374) 
In al-Suri‘s analysis, such preconditions that are necessary for the Open Front Jihad 
are factors related to geography, population and politics. As far as the countries 
Afghanistan-Pakistan, Iraq and Yemen is concerned, the preconditions are well met 
to enable an initiation of the Open Front Jihad.  Those countries are convenient in 
terms of geography and population. They are large countries without well fortified 
borders, thus they are difficult to siege and contain. Except Iraq and Afghanistan, in 
which there is tangible foreign military presence, in Pakistan and Yemen, 
governments suffer from the lack of support on the part of a certain segment of their 
population. The populations of those countries are also affected from the general 
circumstances following the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan. As its appeal has 
risen after the U.S. invasions,  al-Qaeda devised ways of influencing and penetrating 
into those countries‘ population without much difficulty. 
 
The situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan are interconnected to each other. This is 
evident in the resurgence of Taliban after 2006. The increased Taliban activity in 
Afghanistan and the militant presence in its border with Pakistan, caused 
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radicalization among the Pashtun tribes of Pakistan‘s North West Frontier Province5 
Taliban, which culminated in the formation of a Pakistani Taliban (Rana, 2009). 
Besides, Pakistan already had its militant groups, especially for its covert activities 
in India-administered Jammu-Kashmir (Ahmad, 2004). Also it is known that some 
institutions of the Pakistani establishment had an involvement in Taliban‘s rise to 
power and dissident voices had been heard within the Pakistani state institutions 
after General Pervez Musharaf decided to support America in its Afghanistan 
campaign (Oakley and Gady, 2009). As Pakistan failed to adopt a staunch stance 
towards militant groups in the aftermath of the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, al-
Qaeda and Taliban leadership found refuge in the border regions.  
 
Al-Qaeda, while already having ties with the Afghan Taliban, started to spread its 
influence amongst the Pakistani groups as well. The local groups and al-Qaeda have 
developed a kind of mutually beneficial relationship. Al-Qaeda assists local groups 
in terms of training and actual fighter support, while local groups‘ activities present 
al-Qaeda with propaganda opportunities. Besides, al-Qaeda‘s larger strategic vision 
frames the tactical moves by local groups such as Taliban, in its general 
confrontational perspective. It means that while a specific, local victory in 
Afghanistan would mean a significant development for a local Taliban group albeit 
in a narrow sense, al-Qaeda possesses the outlook, vision and intellectual capacity to 
enhance that victory as a great achievement for the Muslim nation, i.e. the Ummah. 
Al-Qaeda has already depicted some developments in the past in a similar fashion 
claimed above. The lessons and messages that al-Qaeda has derived from the 
Hezbollah‘s bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in 1983, and the attack by local 
                                                 
5
 It is renamed as Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa in 2010. 
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militants against the U.S. forces in Mogadishu, Somalia in 1995 has been translated 
into a strategic approach by al-Qaeda.   
 
In Iraq, the insurgency consisted of various elements and some of them such as the 
Baathists and Shiite militias were considered unfit for an al-Qaeda penetration. 
However, the Iraqi Sunnis, from which the ruling class hailed from since its 
independence, were ousted from political power and posed a high potential for an al-
Qaeda affiliation. The Iraq insurgency proves to be an important instance on the 
ways that al-Qaeda co-opts local movements. The Islamic State of Iraq, which is 
considered the al-Qaeda associate today originated in Abu Musab al Zarqawi‘s 
organization, Jamaat al-Tawhid wal Jihad.  
 
Abu Musab al Zarqawi held a notorious reputation in Iraq due to his cruel and even 
brutal tactics, such as mass-casualty bombings and beheadings. His group pledged 
allegiance to al-Qaeda and was renamed as al-Qaeda in the Land of Two Rivers in 
October 2004. It is responsible for high profile suicide bombings and the sectarian 
conflict that heightened the instability in Iraq between 2004 and 2007. After al 
Zarqawi‘s death in 2006, Ayyub al Masri from Egypt has assumed the command 
and the group was renamed the Islamic State of Iraq at the end of 2006.  
 
Al-Qaeda has been inciting Muslims to travel to Iraq and fight the Americans for 
quite some time. From 2003 on, the call to jihad in Iraq represents an important 
theme in al-Qaeda statements. Iraq represents a dual importance for al-Qaeda. 
Firstly, it constitutes a part of al-Qaeda‘s conflict with the U.S. in a local aspect, 
second, it serves as a ―springboard for a wider regional conflict‖ (Al-Shishani, 
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2005). The Amman attacks in November 2005 by al-Zarqawi‘s group represent the 
secondary dimension. In this respect, it is obvious that Iraq provided al-Qaeda to 
fight against both the ―far enemy‖ and the ―near enemy‖ (Gergez, 2005).  
 
 
4.4. Assessment 
 
The guerilla warfare approach constitutes another significant element of al-Qaeda‘s 
strategy. Osama bin Laden announced the adoption of this approach in the 
declaration of war by al-Qaeda in 1996. Within al-Qaeda‘s strategy, the guerilla 
warfare involved several elements. These are 
 Broadening the area of confrontation to a great geographical extent by the 
dispersion of al-Qaeda forces,  
 Denying the enemy (the United States) a decisive victory by avoiding direct 
confrontation with its superior military force,  
 Extending the confrontation over time for wearing down the enemy in 
military, economic and political sense, restoring the damage that al-Qaeda 
initially suffered and making excessive use of propaganda material, 
 Engaging in local insurgencies against the enemy in order to take advantage 
of specific opportunities that local situations present. 
Those elements, which are derived from the practices of al-Qaeda after 2001, 
comprise a pattern that helped compensate for the asymmetry it faced. That pattern 
involved but was not limited to terrorism. Rather it allows for a meaningful and 
satisfactory analysis through taking into consideration the guerilla warfare approach 
declared by Osama bin Laden and outlined by Abu Musab al-Suri. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
As explained in the introduction part, the main purpose of this thesis is to examine 
the effects of the strategy on the survival of al-Qaeda in the post-2001 period. In a 
general evaluation in the framework of the questions that are mentioned in the 
introduction part, the stated results can be listed as: 
 
The contemporary asymmetrical conflicts in the onset of the 21
st
 century pose an 
important challenge for international security. Those conflicts have a significant 
asymmetrical nature in terms of elements of quality and quantity. The quantifiable 
elements are military, economic and technological disparities between the parties to 
the conflict. The element that has a qualitative nature is the difference of status 
between the parties. Conflicts take place between states and non-state armed groups, 
which have significantly risen in significance at the end of the 20
th
 century. Such 
conflicts are not recent phenomenon in international politics. In the period following 
the Second World War, asymmetrical conflicts took place in various parts of the 
world against former colonial empires and the United States of America in the 
context of decolonization. The striking element is that in these conflicts non-state 
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armed groups, the weak parties, have scored victory against highly industrialized 
powers, the strong parties. The Chinese resistance against Japan, the Vietnam 
conflict against France and the United States of America are the earlier examples of 
victory. The Afghan mujahedeen resistance against the Soviet Union is another 
example of victory that was based upon certain strategic principles derived from the 
earlier examples.  
 
Those strategic principles constitute the outline of strategy for non-state armed 
groups. Such a strategy involves several elements. The major basis for this strategy 
is an indirect approach. It includes the absence of direct, decisive, military 
confrontation, the length of the conflict and the broadening of conflict through an 
excessive military approach by the state party that backfires as main elements. 
Through this approach the major blow of the non-state party is directed at the 
political will of the state party to carry on the conflict. Under the conditions of the 
asymmetrical conflict, these strategic principles serve the non-state group to offset 
the disadvantages it faces. Al-Qaeda engaged with the United States of America 
under such conditions. Consistent with the strategic principles stressed above, al-
Qaeda guided its actions and reactions in a way that benefited itself under the 
asymmetry. Thus, it was able to derive advantages from the course of conflict in the 
Middle East. Al-Qaeda‘s strategy of guerilla warfare on a regional scale ensured the 
longevity of the conflict. Thus, as time progresses, the will of the U.S. to carry on 
the struggle against al-Qaeda was distracted if not diminished. Throughout this 
period, consistent with the guerilla warfare strategy, al-Qaeda offered no 
opportunity for a direct confrontation to the United States. Al-Qaeda, basically 
avoided direct clashes in order to ensure its survival. This point is very well 
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consistent with the indirect approach. According to the guerilla warfare strategy, al-
Qaeda dispersed its forces in its constituency for both avoiding the US power 
projection and forcing to enemy to over extend its defensive capabilities. Therefore, 
al-Qaeda sought to turn the disadvantages of the asymmetrical conflict into 
advantages for itself, through applying and articulating a guerilla warfare strategy.  
 
An evaluation of the strategy of al-Qaeda and its conflict with the U.S. within this 
conceptional framework is hampered by the overall understanding and traditional 
approaches towards al-Qaeda. The conventional understanding of al-Qaeda, 
generally, places it within the confines of religious terrorism. It focuses on the 
religious rhetoric and ideological aspect of al-Qaeda. It goes to the extent that 
individual motivation for terrorism is taken into consideration. Therefore, it detaches 
al-Qaeda from its political and historical context. Through depriving al-Qaeda from 
a political perspective, the conventional understanding implies that a political 
rationale is irrelevant to al-Qaeda, which is a religious terrorist group that performs 
violence per se. Nevertheless, certain works within the religious terrorism studies 
are helpful because they provide a great deal of factual information related to al-
Qaeda. However, this study diverges from the religious terrorism studies in the way 
that the factual information is evaluated.  
 
In order to evaluate the strategy of al-Qaeda, the study went through the historical 
and political developments at the end of the 20
th
 century that are relevant to the 
emergence of al-Qaeda. After al-Qaeda‘s genesis has been deliberated, the research 
on the political context has revealed a general pattern in the fin de siécle Middle 
East that is the shortcomings of the Middle Eastern states in various dimensions that 
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led to the rise of non-state actors in the region. Al-Qaeda is a part of this trend that 
intended to substitute for states‘ failure in a general sense. Therefore, the context 
that al-Qaeda has emerged from is rich in elements that provide al-Qaeda experience 
and insights.   
 
After placing al-Qaeda within the historical and political contexts, the study moved 
on to handle its strategy. Al-Qaeda‘s political rationale was deemed as an 
underlying element in its strategy, which guided its actions and reactions within the 
onset of the conflict in 1996 by itself. Al-Qaeda‘s reasons for going to war, the 
constituency that it primarily addresses, and the tactics it adopted under 
asymmetrical conditions reflect its political rationale. The communication is another 
important element within al-Qaeda‘s strategy. For survival concerns, propaganda 
needs and the conduct of its assets al-Qaeda focused on communications. Therefore, 
it has found the opportunity to bypass the international restrictions imposed upon it 
by intensifying its communication efforts, mainly through Internet usage. Al-
Qaeda‘s conduct of the war represents a guerilla warfare approach. As the final but 
not the least important element of its strategy, this approach involves more than 
terrorism. Al-Qaeda, adopting the guerilla warfare approach, engages America in a 
wide geographical extent; however it avoids a decisive confrontation with it. 
Correspondingly, al-Qaeda seeks to extend the confrontation over time in order to 
wear down the U.S. political will to continue its presence in the Middle East. This 
element provides al-Qaeda with a breathing space after its initial setbacks in 2001. 
Al-Qaeda also makes use of local insurgencies in the Middle East, in which it adopts 
both a terrorist and an open front approach. 
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Finally, if a general evaluation is to be made within the framework of the hypothesis 
mentioned in the introduction, these solutions could be reached: 
 
Within the conceptional framework involving asymmetrical conflicts between state 
and non-state actors, the study attempts to prove that the strategy factor, that is 
derived from past experiences and developed in the transnational context of current 
conflicts is the main element that contributes to survival of a non-state groups. Al-
Qaeda‘s survival beyond 2001 owes to its strategy in a hostile atmosphere. That 
atmosphere consisted of increasing counterterrorism efforts by America and its 
allies, coupled with the U.S. invasions in Iraq and Afghanistan. Besides, the 
asymmetrical character of the conflict is a prevalent factor in this atmosphere. Al-
Qaeda was deprived from its sanctuary and was forced to remain out of sight. 
Whereas the necessities of the asymmetrical conflict could prove as disadvantages 
for non-state groups, al-Qaeda utilized the elements of its strategy to offset those 
disadvantages and capitalize on its relative advantages. It employed a 
communication element within its strategy. Al-Qaeda continuously disseminated 
messages and statements to both hostile and friendly audiences. It sought a global 
audience. As the communication aspect started to take an important place within the 
current conflict, al-Qaeda proved to be adept at transmitting its message, using the 
latest communication techniques made available by technology, therefore it enjoyed 
a great deal of publicity that could both have an impact on its adversary and create 
an appeal within its constituency. Through increased vigilance in counterterrorism 
efforts, al-Qaeda faced a risk of isolation after its sanctuary has been disrupted. 
However, the communication aspect of its strategy enabled al-Qaeda to break such 
isolation.  
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Al-Qaeda‘s conduct of the actual conflict involved the employment of indirect 
guerilla warfare approach. Al-Qaeda refrained from direct clash with superior 
American forces, which would be near-suicidal. With this approach, al-Qaeda does 
not seek the destruction of the U.S. forces in the Middle East. Therefore, direct 
engagement would bear no fruit for it. Rather, al-Qaeda seeks to influence the 
political will of its enemies, as it was demonstrated in the 2004 Madrid Attacks that 
led to the withdrawal of Spain from Iraq. Terrorist attacks suit this approach due to 
their indirect nature that seeks some impact beyond damaging the immediate target. 
In this context, al-Qaeda‘s strategy depends on the practice of indirect approach in 
the conflict that will allow it to avoid defeat so that actual confrontation will take a 
much longer time. Therefore, al-Qaeda seeks to extend the duration of the conflict 
until the U.S. could no longer sustain its military commitments in the Middle East. 
Employing an indirect guerilla warfare approach enables al-Qaeda to offset its 
disadvantages in military sense.   
 
Al-Qaeda‘s strategy depends on a careful and deliberate assessment of important 
contexts and developments at the end of the 20
th
 century. It is al-Qaeda‘s political 
rationale that makes possible the assessment as such. It is needed to study al-Qaeda 
in its political and historical context to understand and underline the importance of 
its political rationale. Al-Qaeda is a transnational non-state armed group that 
emerged under the conditions of general state failure in the Middle East observed in 
the 1990s. It sought to substitute state in security matters. Based on its perception 
and conceptualization of the insecurities of its constituency, i.e. the Muslim nation, 
al-Qaeda strove to eliminate those insecurities. Therefore, in 1996, it initiated a 
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conflict with America, which al-Qaeda considered to be the main element beneath 
the problems and insecurities that the Muslim nation faced. In its struggle, al-Qaeda 
adopted a rational manner, with which it evaluated the present condition, sought 
ways for better conducting the conflict, and formulate a general pattern that 
elements of its strategy will fit in. After 2001, al-Qaeda has deepened its indirect 
approach to the conflict. The September 11 attacks drove the U.S. into a more 
extensive presence in the Middle East. This has provided al-Qaeda to broaden the 
area of confrontation and pull the U.S. into a war of attrition. Al-Qaeda aimed to 
sabotage the political will of the U.S. to carry on its presence in the lands of the 
Muslim nation. For achieving this aim, al-Qaeda initiated spectacular terrorist 
attacks and took advantage of the atmosphere that those attacks created with an 
intensified approach in communication that it addressed towards both friendly and 
hostile audiences through the Internet.   
 
Those points show that the initial disadvantages of the asymmetrical conflict could 
be offset by such a strategic approach outlined above. Therefore, al-Qaeda was able 
to compensate for the asymmetrical conditions of the conflict. The explanations in 
the main body of the study sought to verify that through the compensation of the 
asymmetry it faces, al-Qaeda‘s strategy became the primary factor in its survival 
beyond 2001. 
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